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Securities regulation deals primarily with the laws preventing and
providing remedies for fraud in the sale of stocks and bonds. Texas has
two major statutes to combat securities fraud: The Texas Securities Act
(TSA) and the Texas Stock Fraud Act (TSFA).1 Since the legislature
modeled the fraud provisions of the TSA on the federal statutes,2 Texas
courts use federal decisions under the federal statutes to interpret the
* H. Andy Professor of Commercial Law, St. Mary’s University School of Law, San
Antonio, Texas; B.A., 1966, B.S., 1966, M.A., 1969, University of Texas at Austin; Nuc. E.
1969, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Ph.D. (Physics), 1973, J.D. 1975, University of
Texas at Austin.
1. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-1 to 581-600 (West 2010); TEX. BUS. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 27.01 (West 2015).
2. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33 cmt. (Comment to 1977 Amendment);
House Comm. of Financial Institutions, Tex. S.B. 469, 65th Leg., R.S. (1977).
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TSA’s similar language.3 This Article, therefore, includes the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit cases involving state law and securities
fraud under federal law. The author does not intend for this Article to
exhaust all aspects of securities regulation, but rather to update the
Texas-based securities practitioner on new developments of interest
during the period of November 1, 2013 to October 31, 2015.
I. COVERAGE OF THE TEXAS SECURITIES ACTS
The definitions, especially those relating to what constitutes a security
or a stock and the persons liable, as well as federal preclusion of state
securities fraud actions, determine the fraudulent transactions subject to
the state’s securities acts.4 Texas courts, both state courts under the TSA
and federal courts under a similar provision in the Securities Act (SA),5
have determined that interests in life settlements constitute “investment
contracts” and therefore are securities under both the TSA and the SA;
consequently, the state and investors can sue for securities fraud against
fraudsters peddling interests in life settlements.6 A Texas court also deter-
mined that an employee’s separation contract that provided for immedi-
ate vesting of all previously awarded restricted stock awards satisfied the
TSFA requirement for a transaction involving stock in a corporation so
that an employer could sue for statutory fraud against a defrauding em-
ployee.7 Additionally, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that certifi-
cates of deposit backed by “covered securities” were not covered
securities for purposes of excluding remedies under the TSA by the Se-
curities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA)8 so that victims of a
Ponzi scheme could sue the aiders and abettors of the fraud.9
3. See, e.g., Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P. v. Ryder Scott Co., 402 S.W.3d 719, 741
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.); Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int’l, Inc. v.
Haskell, 193 S.W.3d 87, 102 n.13 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied); see
also George Lee Flint, Jr., Securities Regulation, 66 SMU L. REV. 1129, 1129–30 n.3 (2013)
[hereinafter Flint 66] (discussing Highland Capital Management, L.P.); George Lee Flint,
Jr., Securities Regulation, 60 SMU L. REV. 1293, 1293–1302 (2007) [hereinafter Flint 60]
(discussing Haskell, 193 S.W.3d 87).
4. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1)–(3) (2012); TEX. CIV. STAT ANN. art. 581-4(A)–(B).
5. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(2)(a)(1)–(2).
6. See Life Partners, Inc. v. Arnold, 464 S.W.3d 660, 662 (Tex. 2015) [hereinafter
Arnold II]; Arnold v. Life Partners, Inc., 416 S.W.3d 577, 592 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013)
[hereinafter Arnold I], aff’d, 464 S.W.3d 660 (Tex. 2015); State v. Life Partners Holdings,
Inc., 459 S.W.3d 619, 621 (Tex. App.—Austin 2014) [hereinafter Life Partners Holdings],
aff’d sub nom., 464 S.W.3d 660 (Tex. 2015); S.E.C. v. Life Partners Holdings, Inc., 41 F.
Supp. 3d 550, 556 (W.D. Tex. 2013) [hereinafter Life Partners Holdins 2013].
7. Ginn v. NCI Bldg. Sys., Inc., 472 S.W.3d 802, 824 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
Aug. 13, 2015, no pet. h.).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1)(A).
9. Chadbourne & Park LLP v. Troice, 134 S. Ct. 1058, 1062 (2014).
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A. CONFIRMATION THAT INTERESTS IN LIFE SETTLEMENTS
ARE SECURITIES
The Texas Supreme Court, consolidating two appeals from lower courts
of appeals, one for investors from Dallas and one for the Texas State
Securities Board (TSSB) from Austin, affirmed the courts of appeals’ de-
cisions holding that interests in life settlements constitute investment con-
tracts and therefore are securities under the TSA.10 Similarly, a federal
district court in Texas made the same determination for the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) under the analogous provision of federal
law.11
1. State Law
The key issue for the Texas Supreme Court in Life Partners, Inc. v.
Arnold involved interests in life settlements.12 A life settlement is a trans-
action under which an owner of a life insurance policy sells the policy at a
discount (reflecting a future rate of return and premium costs over the
owner’s expected life) in order to obtain current moneys to spend.13 Life
Partners is a financial intermediary that locates the policy sellers, negoti-
ates the discount, locates investors to provide the purchase price of frac-
tional interests in the life insurance policies, takes title to the policies as
agents of the investors, and maintains a trust fund to pay the premiums. If
the insured outlives the life expectancy used to discount the sales price of
the policy, Life Partners requires the investors to contribute additional
amounts to pay premiums needed to continue the policies. Life Partners,
led by the serial fraudster Brian D. Pardo,14 is notorious for underesti-
mating the life expectancies used in calculating the discounts.15 Life Part-
10. See Arnold II, 464 S.W.3d at 662–63.
11. See Life Partners Holdings 2013, 41 F. Supp. 3d at 556.
12. See Arnold II, 464 S.W.3d at 662. The other issue in the case involved whether to
give the decision only a prospective application, since a retroactive application would vio-
late both the Texas Constitution and the federal Constitution prohibitions against retroac-
tive laws. The supreme court declined to give the decision only a prospective application.
Id. In Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, the U.S. Supreme Court requires that the decision estab-
lish a new principle of law for non-retroactivity. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97,
106–07 (1971). Federal courts had established this principle of law for life settlements at
least ten years before in SEC v. Mut. Benefits Corp. SEC v. Mut. Benefits Corp. (Mut.
Benefits), 408 F.3d 737, 743 (11th Cir. 2005).
13. FINANCIAL INDUSTRY REGULATORY AUTHORITY, Seniors Beware: What You
Should Know About Life Settlements, 2011, at 1, 1, http://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/
InvestorDocument/p125848.pdf [https://perma.cc/7VMP-4ZBQ].
14. The principal behind Life Partners, Inc.—a subsidiary of Life Partners Holdings,
Inc. and a public company located in Waco, Texas—was Brian D. Pardo. See George Lee
Flint, Jr., Securities Regulation, 1 SMU ANN. TEX. SURV. 101, 102 n.10 (2014) [hereinafter
Flint 1] (discussing some of Brian D. Pardo’s other frauds, the author’s former firm’s repre-
sentation of Brian D. Pardo’s prior public corporation for securities matters, and the SEC’s
earlier attempts to stop his securities frauds).
15. See, e.g., Mark Maremont & Leslie Scism, Odds Skew Against Investors In Bets on
Strangers’ Lives, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 21, 2010), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240
52748704694004576019344291967866 [https://perma.cc/PH5B-92QP] (for investments made
in 2002 through 2005, 83% of the insureds lived past their life expectancies calculated by
Life Partners).
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ners concealed this information from the investors prior to their
purchases.16 These miscalculations reduced the expected rates of return
and increased the premium costs, potentially leading to losses on the in-
vestment.17 Life Partners concealed those errors by providing the inves-
tors with only the total acquisition cost and no breakdown of the amounts
paid to the policy owners, the escrow amount, Life Partners’ fees, or the
expenses such as physician fees, escrow fees, consultant fees, and broker
fees.18
Life Partners, Inc. v. Arnold involved two cases: one from the Dallas
Court of Appeals and one from the Austin Court of Appeals, consoli-
dated for purposes of oral argument.19 In the Dallas Court of Appeals
case,20 the investors of interests in the life settlements sued in district
court under the TSA for rescission or damages for failure to register the
interests with the Texas State Securities Board (TSSB)21 and for making
an untrue statement of a material fact by claiming the life settlements
were not securities.22 Life Partners filed a counterclaim against the inves-
tors, asserting that the investors’ claims were groundless and brought to
harass. Life Partners then moved for summary judgment on the investors’
claims and its counterclaim, contending that no violation of the TSA oc-
curred because the interests in the life settlements were not securities as a
matter of law, the TSA excludes contracts of insurance from the defini-
tion of security,23 and the TSA’s statute of limitations had run on most of
the claims.24 The district court granted the motion for summary judgment
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Arnold I, 416 S.W.3d 577, 587 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013), aff’d, 464 S.W.3d 660
(Tex. 2015).
19. Arnold II, 464 S.W.3d 660, 662–63 (Tex. 2015).
20. See Arnold I, 416 S.W 3d 577; see also Flint 1, supra note 14, at 102–09 (discussing
Arnold I).
21. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33(A)(2) (West 2010) (“A person who
offers or sells a security in violation of Section 7 [requiring registration with the TSSB] . . .
is liable to the person buying the security from him . . . for rescission or for damages if the
buyer no longer owns the security”). The action was brought as a class action, but the trial
court did not certify a class. Since the securities involved are not covered securities, the
class action need not be brought in federal court. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b) & (c) (2012)
(Securities Act: requiring class actions involving covered securities based on state law al-
leging an untrue statement or omission to be maintained in federal court); §§ 77p(f)(3),
77r(b) (Securities Act: defining covered securities as listed on a national exchange or sold
only to accredited persons).
22. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33(A)(2) (“A person who offers or sells a
security . . . by means of an untrue statement of a material fact . . . is liable to the person
buying the security from him . . . for rescission or for damages if the buyer no longer owns
the security.”).
23. See id. art. 581-4(A) (“Provided, however, that this definition [of “security”] shall
not apply to any insurance policy, endowment policy, annuity contract, optional annuity
contract, or any contract or agreement in relation to and in consequence of any such policy
or contract, issued by an insurance company subject to the supervision or control of the
Texas Department of Insurance when the form or such policy or contract has been duly
filed with the Department . . . .”).
24. For the failure to register claim, the statute of limitations is three years from the
date of the sale. See id. art. 581-33(H)(1) (“(1) No person may sue under Section 33A(1)
. . . more than three years after the sale”). For the untrue statements claim, the statute of
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and found the investors’ pleadings frivolous. The court of appeals found
that the interests in the life settlements were indeed investment contracts,
not insurance contracts, and were therefore securities, and affirmed in
part (the claims on which the statute of limitations had run), reversed and
rendered in part (the harassment claim), and reversed and remanded in
part (the claims on which the statute of limitations had not run).25
In the Austin Court of Appeals case,26 the TSSB, through the Attorney
General, filed a lawsuit against Life Partners and its principals, Brian D.
Pardo and R. Scott Peden, in district court in Travis County for violations
of the TSA, seeking injunctive relief, the appointment of a receiver over
both Life Partners, Inc. and Life Partners Holdings, Inc. (the parent cor-
poration), restitution, disgorgement, a constructive trust, and civil penal-
ties.27 The district court, finding that the interests in life settlements were
not securities, denied the relief sought by the TSSB. The court of appeals,
rendering its decision in a memorandum opinion after the last survey,
agreed with and adopted the analysis of the Dallas Court of Appeals.28
The Texas Supreme Court noted that the term “security” includes an
“investment contract,”29 that the term was modeled on the federal defini-
tion of a security,30 that the TSA authorizes a broad construction to im-
plement its remedial purposes,31 and that the court had previously relied
on the U.S. Supreme Court in determining whether a particular invest-
ment scheme constituted an investment contract for TSA purposes.32
Consequently, the supreme court examined the U.S. Supreme Court’s de-
cisions33 on investment contracts as securities and gleaned three interpre-
tive principles applicable to determining whether any investment contract
qualifies as a security: (1) construe investment contracts to maximize the
protection to investors; (2) use economic realities to determine whether
the requirements of an investment contract are met; and (3) disregard the
limitations is three years from the discovery of the untruth, but no more than five years
from the sale. See id. art. 581-33(H)(2) (“(2) No person may sue under Section 33A(2) . . .
more than three years after discovery of the untruth or omission, or after discovery should
have been made by the exercise of reasonable diligence; or . . . more than five years after
the sale . . . .”).
25. Arnold I, 416 S.W.3d at 588, 592–93.
26. See Life Partners Holdings, 459 S.W.3d 619 (Tex. App.—Austin 2014), aff’d, 464
S.W.3d 660 (Tex. 2015).
27. See Brief of Appellant at viii, Life Partners Holdings, 459 S.W.3d 619 (Tex. App.—
Austin 2014) (No. 03-13-00195-CV), 2013 WL 3973955.
28. See Life Partners Holdings, 459 S.W.3d at 620; see generally Arnold I, 416 S.W 3d
577.
29. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-4(A) (“The term ‘security’ . . . shall in-
clude . . . investment contract . . . .”).
30. See Searsy v. Commercial Trading Corp., 560 S.W.2d 637, 639 (Tex. 1977).
31. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-4(A) (“The term ‘security’ . . . includes . . .
any other instrument commonly known as a security, whether similar to those herein re-
ferred to or not”).
32. See Searsy, 560 S.W.2d at 639–41.
33. See SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389 (2004); Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56
(1990); United Hous. Found. Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.,
328 U.S. 293 (1946); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing, 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
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terminology used by the parties to describe their investment contract.34
The supreme court had previously determined that a purported invest-
ment contract must satisfy four requirements to be a security: “(1) an
investment of money; (2) a common enterprise; (3) an expectation of
profit;” and (4) a profit predominantly from the entrepreneurial or mana-
gerial efforts of others.35 This fourth requirement modified the Supreme
Court’s requirement of “solely from the efforts of others”36 in two re-
spects: “solely” had become expanded to “predominant,” and “efforts of
others” had become restricted to “entrepreneurial or managerial efforts
of others.”37 Since the only real question for interests in life settlements
was the last element,38 the supreme court reexamined related federal
court precedent, including Supreme Court opinions modifying this fourth
requirement and concluded that the Texas version agreed with the cur-
rent federal interpretation of the fourth requirement.39 Life Partners
34. See generally Searsy, 560 S.W.2d 637.
35. See id. at 640–41.
36. See W.J. Howey, 328 U.S. at 301 (an investment contract “involves an investment
of money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of others”).
37. Arnold II, 464 S.W.3d 660, 681 (Tex. 2015).
38. See Mut. Benefits, 408 F.3d 737, 743 (11th Cir. 2005); SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 87
F.3d 536, 549 (D.C. Cir. 1996) [hereinafter Life Partners 1996] (Wald, J., dissenting). For
some federal circuits, the common enterprise element might not be satisfied by interests in
life settlements. There are two types of common enterprise: (1) horizontal commonality
(multiple investors under a promoter); and (2) vertical commonality (an investor and a
promoter). The Fifth and Ninth Circuits recognize vertical commonality, while the Seventh
Circuit does not. See Zang v. Alliance Fin. Serv. of Ill., Ltd., No. 08-C-3370, 2010 WL
3842366, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2010) (finding interests in life settlements not to be
securities for failure to satisfy the common enterprise element).
39. See United Hous. Found. Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975) (“This test, in
shorthand form . . . is the presence of an investment in a common venture premised on a
reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial
efforts of others;” omitting “solely” and inserting “entrepreneurial or managerial”). For
federal circuit court cases dealing with “solely,” see McCown v. Heidler, 527 F.2d 204, 214
(10th Cir. 1975) (finding that total reliance on promoter is not required); SEC v. Koscot
Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 475 (5th Cir. 1974) (demonstrating that efforts by others
than the investors are the significant ones essential for success); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner
Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973) (explaining that a security finding could be
evaded by requiring a modicum of effort by the investor); see also SEC v. Int’l Loan Net-
work Inc., 968 F.2d 1304, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (finding that the profits were expected to
accrue “predominantly from the efforts of others”); Bailey v. J.W.K. Props., Inc., 904 F.2d
918, 920 (4th Cir. 1990) (concluding that “the most essential functions or duties must be
performed by others and not the investors”); Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 418 (5th
Cir. 1981) (noting that in Forman, the Supreme Court omitted solely). For federal circuit
court cases dealing with “entrepreneurial or management,” see Fargo Partners v. Dain
Corp., 540 F.2d 912, 914–15 (8th Cir. 1976) (finding that “[w]here investors’ duties were
nominal and insignificant, their roles were perfunctory or ministerial, or they lacked any
real control over the enterprise, the contracts are securities as investment contracts,” but
where purchasers of an apartment building “retained ultimate control of the operation of
the apartment complex by reserving the right to fire [the sellers] . . . on 30 days’ notice,”
the transaction is not an investment contract); see also Long v. Shultz Cattle Co., 881 F.2d
129, 134 (5th Cir. 1989) (finding that cattle feeding consulting agreements were securities
as investment contracts where investors had theoretical control since they were required to
authorize every management decision, but it was undisputed that at each management
decision the investors relied on the seller’s advice); Siebel v. Scott, 725 F.2d 995, 998 (5th
Cir. 1984) (characterizing limited partnership units as investment contracts, thus securities,
where there was “no evidence that any of the limited partners planned or desired to par-
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agreed.40
The supreme court then went on to address the issue of the timing of
the entrepreneurial and managerial efforts.41 One federal circuit court42
had limited consideration of entrepreneurial and managerial efforts to af-
ter the sale of the investment, an opinion one court of appeals had fol-
lowed.43 Another federal circuit court44 later rejected that approach and
considered both pre- and post-sale efforts, a decision followed by the two
courts of appeals whose opinions were before the supreme court.45 The
supreme court decided to follow the latter approach.46 The TSA permits
a construction to maximize investor protection and coordination with fed-
eral law47 and protects investors from harmful acts of promoters before
ticipate in the operation” of the investment); Martin v. T.V. Tempo, Inc., 628 F.2d 887, 890
(5th Cir. 1980) (holding franchise agreements are not investment contracts where franchis-
ees had exclusive right to sell advertisements for and arrange distribution of TV magazine
in defined areas).
40. For the “predominant” modification, see Brief of Appellee at 9, Arnold II, 464
S.W.3d 660 (Tex. 2015) (No. 14-0226), 2014 WL 6453571 (contending “that the efforts of
the investors were [not] sufficient to defeat the existence of an investment contract”); Brief
of Appellant Life Partners, Inc. at 13–16, Arnold II, 464 S.W.3d 660 (Tex. 2015) (No. 14-
0122), 2014 WL 4185527 (arguing that many courts have declined to interpret the “solely
from the efforts of others” prong of the Howey test strictly). For the “entrepreneurial or
managerial” modification, see Brief of Appellants at 21–22, Arnold II, 464 S.W.3d 660
(Tex. 2015) (No. 14-0226), 2014 WL 4185528 (contending that the efforts of Life Partners
were not entrepreneurial or managerial); Brief of Appellant Life Partners, Inc. at 17, Ar-
nold II, 464 S.W.3d 660 (No. 14-0122), 2014 WL 4185527 (“[F]or investment contract to
arise, the promoter must commit to enhancing the value of the investment through its
entrepreneurial or managerial efforts.”). Life Partners contended their duties were not en-
trepreneurial or managerial but were to protect, preserve, and maintain property, which
are ministerial functions. See Brief of Appellant Life Partners, Inc. at 19, Arnold II, 464
S.W.3d 660 (No. 14-0122), 2014 WL 4185527.
41. Arnold II, 464 S.W.3d at 676–80.
42. See Life Partners 1996, 87 F.3d at 545–46; but see id. at 552 (Wald, J., dissenting)
(purporting that the focus should be on the investors’ dependence on the promoter and
lack of information, which makes the life settlement different from non-securities invest-
ments such as silver bars or paintings). The dissent noted that other federal circuit courts
had used pre-sale efforts in the determination of the presence of an investment contract.
See id. at 552–53; see also Gary Plastic Packaging Corp. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 756 F.2d 230, 240–41 (2d Cir. 1985) (involving a promoter who used market
power to negotiate favorable CD rates with banks and agreed to maintain a secondary
market for the CDs, a ministerial duty, afterwards); Gordon v. Terry, 684 F.2d 736, 740–43
(11th Cir. 1982) (involving a promoter’s expertise in locating bargain-priced properties for
the investor to purchase as well as post-purchase activities); Glenn-Arden Commodities,
Inc. v. Constantino, 493 F.2d 1027, 1035 (2d Cir. 1974) (finding that investor profits de-
pended on promoter’s expertise in selecting whisky for purchase as well as promise to buy
the whisky back in the future).
43. See Griffitts v. Life Partners, Inc., No. 10-01-00271-CV, 2004 WL 1178418, at *2
(Tex. App.—Waco May 26, 2004, no pet.) (succumbing to the erroneous post-sale/pre-sale
distinction, only significant post-sale factor is death of insured, not efforts of others).
44. See Mut. Benefits, 408 F.3d 737, 743 (11th Cir. 2005) (violation of federal securities
acts); see also Wulliger v. Eberle, 414 F. Supp. 2d 814, 824 (N.D. Ohio 2006) (same).
45. Arnold II, 464 S.W.3d at 662–63.
46. Id. at 676–80.
47. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-10-1(A) (West 2010) (“This Act may be
construed and implemented to effectuate its general purpose to maximize coordination
with federal and other states’ law and administration . . . .”); id. art. 581-10-1(B) (“This Act
may be construed and implemented to effectuate its general purposes to protect investors
. . . .”).
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the sale of the security in other situations.48 Consequently, the supreme
court also rejected as inconsistent with the TSA the idea that an invest-
ment contract could not exist without some post-sale efforts.49
Having determined the legal principles to apply, the supreme court
proceeded to apply them to the facts of Life Partners. There was no doubt
that the pre-sale activities (identifying the insured, negotiating the dis-
count for the policy, evaluating the policy’s terms and conditions, and
evaluating the health of the insured) satisfied the entrepreneurial and
management activities.50 Even the federal circuit court, excluding consid-
eration of pre-sale activities from the determination of an investment
contract, had concluded that the pre-purchase activities were essential to
the success of the investment.51 But, the supreme court also found that
the post-sale activities amounted to entrepreneurial and management ef-
forts.52 Life Partners exercised complete control over the investment
post-sale: It had title to the policy; monitored the policy and its payment
of premiums; notified purchasers if additional premiums were required
when the insured lived beyond the Life Partners’ predicted life expec-
tancy; and in its discretion, made the additional premium payments,
monitored the insureds, obtained death certificates of deceased insureds,
prepared required insurance forms for collection, collected the insurance
payouts, and managed the distributions of the necessary funds to the in-
vestors on a pro-rata basis.53 The investors did not have the power or the
information to complete these tasks. At the beginning of its opinion, the
supreme court noted that Life Partners’s advertising warned potential in-
vestors that they would become entirely dependent on Life Partners for
“premium administration, tracking, and policy benefit collection services”
and that if these tasks were not done properly, the investors could lose
their interests in the policies.54 Consequently, Life Partners’s post-sale
efforts were managerial, not ministerial.55 As such, the life settlement in-
48. See id. art. 581-7(A) (requiring sellers to register and obtain a permit before selling
a security); id. art. 581-7(B)(2)(a)(8)(c) (authorizing the Commissioner of the TSSB to act
against misleading facts at any time before or after registration of the securities); id. art.
581-9 (providing investor protection against misleading offers to sell a security); id. art.
581-22 (regulating offers); id. art. 581-33 (imposing liability for misleading offers to sell a
security).
49. The ridiculous idea that there should be some post-sale effort by the promoters
comes from the State’s brief in their appeal. See Brief of Appellee at 30–31, Arnold II, 464
S.W.3d 660 (Tex. 2015) (No. 14-0226), 2014 WL 6453571 (suggesting such a requirement is
consistent with the dissenting opinion in Life Partners 1996. Life Partners 1996, 87 F.3d
536, 551–52 (D.C. 2008)); but see id. at 552–53 (Wald, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Howey test
can be met by pre-purchase managerial activities of a promoter when it is the success of
these activities, either entirely or predominantly, that determines whether profits are even-
tually realized. . . . I have found no case which holds, as the majority here does, that pre-
purchase activities alone cannot satisfy Howey’s third prong.”).
50. Arnold II, 464 S.W.3d at 681–82.
51. See Life Partners 1996, 87 F.3d at 547.
52. Arnold II, 464 S.W.3d at 681.
53. Id. at 682.
54. Id. at 665.
55. Life Partners viewed their post-sale efforts as ministerial, claiming Life Partners
only held the property in anticipation of appreciation, or as caretaker to protect, preserve,
2016] Securities Regulation 445
terests were investment contracts, and as such, were securities under the
TSA.56
Life Partners, Inc. v. Arnold confirms that Texas securities law is now
near the American mainstream jurisprudence with respect to interests in
life settlements.57 A finding that interests in life settlements are securities
will end the fraud of Life Partners but will not stop legitimate sales of
interests in life settlements. It would only require the appropriate regis-
trations and disclosures required by the TSA, thus exposing the expense
structures and the track record for underestimating life expectancies of
the insureds engaged in by the disreputable Life Partners and, unfortu-
nately for investors, other life settlement companies.58
2. Federal Law
Life Partners fared no better under the federal law that the Texas Su-
and maintain the property, or with no effort to enhance the property. See McConathy v.
Dal Mac Commercial Real Estate, Inc., 545 S.W.2d 871, 874–76 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texar-
kana 1977, no writ) (finding that fractional interest in real estate joint venture is not an
investment contract); Wilson v. Lee, 601 S.W.2d 483, 484 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1980, no
writ) (finding that interest in real estate joint venture is not an investment contract). Com-
pare Rodriguez v. Banco Cent. Corp., 990 F.2d 7, 11 (1st Cir. 1993) (finding that purchase
of lots with no promise for development not an investment contract), with McCown v.
Heidler, 527 F.2d 204, 208 (10th Cir. 1975) (finding that purchase of residential lots with
promise of later improvements is an investment contract); see also Brief of Appellant at
20–24, Arnold II, 464 S.W.3d 660 (Tex. 2015) (No. 14-0122), 2014 WL 4185527 (citing Mc-
Conathy, 545 S.W. 2d 841; Wilson, 601 S.W.2d 483; Rodriguez, 990 F.2d 7; and McCown,
527 F.2d 204); Brief of Appellants at 12–16, Arnold II, 464 S.W.3d 660 (Tex. 2015) (No.14-
0226), 2014 WL 4185528 (same). The claim for the Texas court of appeals cases reveals a
misunderstanding of joint venture law, because the joint venturers had control of the in-
vestment. See McConathy, 545 S.W.2d at 873–74 (involving an investor’s lawyers who thor-
oughly investigated the transaction, where the manager could not sell, transfer, or
encumber without 70% vote of joint venturers); Wilson, 601 S.W.2d at 484 (showing that
60% of joint venturers could fire manager and direct operations, but certain actions could
occur only by a 100% vote). The claim for the Rodriguez case similarly distorts the law,
because the investment contract element involved there was the common enterprise ele-
ment, not the efforts of others element. See Rodriguez, 990 F.2d at 11.
56. Arnold II, 464 S.W.3d at 682.
57. See generally LIFE SETTLEMENTS TASK FORCE, STAFF REPORT TO THE U.S. SEC
(July 22, 2010), www.sec.gov/news/studies/2010/lifesettlements-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/
K5FP-3FC5]. The report indicated that by 2010, thirty-five states had amended their securi-
ties statutes to include interests in life settlements in the definition of security (although
Ky., Iowa, Me., Neb., N.J., N.C., N.D., Ohio, and Wis. exempt the sale between the policy
owner to the promoter), that nine additional states (Del., La., Md., Mass., N.H., N.Y., Ore.,
Va., and Wash.) had found life settlements securities under an investment contract analysis,
and that securities regulators in three additional states (Ala., Pa, and R.I.) had issued pol-
icy statements concluding life settlements as securities under an investment contract analy-
sis. Id. at 36. Only Connecticut and Wyoming had made no determinations. Id. Texas was
listed as divided, with the Waco Court of Appeals determining that life settlements were
not securities and the TSSB issuing cease and desist orders finding life settlements securi-
ties. Id. n.175 (citing Griffitts v. Life Partners, Inc., No. 10-01-00271-CV, 2004 WL 1178418,
at *2 (Tex. App.—Waco May 26, 2004, no pet.); In re Ret. Value, LLC, Bruce Collins &
Richard “Dick” Gray, No. ENF-10-CDO-1686, 2010 WL 1267213, *9 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd.
Mar. 29, 2010)). The staff report recommended an amendment to the federal securities
laws to include interest in life settlements in the definition of securities under the federal
securities laws. Id. at 39.
58. See infra notes 189–203 and accompanying text for a TSSB enforcement action
against another defrauding life settlement company.
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preme Court followed. In SEC v. Life Partners Holdings, Inc.,59 the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) instituted a securities fraud
action60 against Life Partners Holdings, Inc., a public company and par-
ent of Life Partners, as well as Pardo and Peden, its principal officers, for
disclosure and accounting fraud on the sustainability of Life Partners’s
revenues and profit margin. Life Partners concealed from its shareholders
that it systematically used life expectancies known to be materially short,
using a doctor for over ten years to calculate those life expectancies even
though the doctor had no experience in rendering life expectancies or
actuarial training and had never researched the methodology used by life
settlement underwriters. Life Partners failed to disclose to shareholders,
as a contingent risk, the underestimation of life expectancies in the period
from 2006 to 2011. During this period the Colorado Securities Commis-
sioner sued and obtained a $12.8 million settlement with Life Partners61
for selling securities (the life settlement interests) and omitting disclosure
of the high frequency rate at which insureds outlived their predicted life
expectancies.62 Pardo and Peden concealed this information by (1) con-
tinuing to tout high returns during quarterly calls with investors63; (2)
stating that the doctor’s life expectancy calculations and methodology
were consistent with industry practices; (3) giving auditors spread sheets
of the maturities that excluded 1,230 policies where the insureds outlived
their life expectancies; (4) misstating income by prematurely recognizing
revenue64 from life settlement transactions not yet completed; (5)
backdating for the auditors; and (6) failing to properly reduce the value
of the settlement policies owned by Life Partners.65 These officers had
also sold $11.5 million and $300,000 worth of Life Partner stock on mate-
rial, non-public information.66 The SEC sought a permanent injunction
59. 41 F. Supp. 3d 550 (W.D. Tex. 2013).
60. For the allegations subsequently described, see Complaint, Life Partners Holdings
2013, 41 F. Supp. 3d 550 (W.D. Tex. 2013) (No. 12CV00033), 2012 WL 95257 (involving
causes of action for violations of the antifraud provisions of both the Securities Act and
Exchange Act, violations of the reporting provisions and books and records provisions of
the Exchange Act, failure to implement internal control and misconduct in preparing re-
quired reports).
61. See Joseph v. Life Partners, Inc., No. 07CV5218, 2007 WL 1725432, at *4 (Colo.
Div. Sec. May 29, 2007) (listing as one of the material omissions the high frequency rate
that insureds outlive their predicted life expectancies).
62. Life Partners Holdings 2013, 41 F. Supp. 3d at 560.
63. See Joseph, 2007 WL 1725432, at *3 (claiming a 14-year average annual return of
over 16%).
64. Unfortunately, this was not the first instance of Brian D. Pardo’s misstating reve-
nues by accelerating revenue recognition. See SEC, SEC NEWS DIG. 89-137-05, COM-
PLAINT NAMES ASK CORPORATION AND BRIAN D. PARDO (1989) (involving fraud for
overstatement of Ask Corporation’s revenues and profits for the first three quarters in
each of its 1983 and 1984 fiscal years, and the first two quarters in fiscal 1985 in filings with
the SEC); see also Fine v. Am. Solar King Corp., 919 F.2d 290, 293–95 (5th Cir. 1990)
(explaining the method of overstatement for the fiscal 1982: recognizing income before
completing an installment sale).
65. See Complaint ¶ 11–18, Life Partners Holdings 2013, 41 F. Supp. 3d 550 (W.D. Tex.
2013) (No. 12CV00033), 2012 WL 95257.
66. Id. ¶ 11.
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prohibiting these officers from committing or aiding and abetting further
violations of the security laws; barring them from serving as officers or
directors of a public company; and requiring them to disgorge their ill-
gotten gains, to pay civil monetary penalties, and to repay Life Partners
for bonuses and profits paid during the time when Life Partners reported
materially misstated financial results.67
With respect to the SEC’s claim for violation of the antifraud rules for
making misstatements in selling the interests in life settlements, Life Part-
ners and Peden moved for partial summary judgment on the omissions
(the impact of the Colorado actions) and misstatements (about the doc-
tor’s qualifications and rates of return) made to investors in the life settle-
ments68 since they claimed the misstatements did not relate to
securities,69 citing their lone favorable federal circuit court opinion.70 De-
spite the absence of an SEC response, the federal district court was not
bamboozled;71 it found the Eleventh Circuit case suggesting that the
court should consider pre-sale and post-sale efforts72 and seized upon the
dissent in the cited case that suggested that pre-sale efforts alone were
enough.73 Consequently, the district court also found that the sale of the
interests in life settlements constituted investment contracts and there-
fore were securities and accordingly denied the motion for partial sum-
mary judgment.74
After a jury verdict in the SEC’s favor, the district court permanently
enjoined Life Partners and its principal officers from committing, or aid-
ing and abetting future violations of the Exchange Act (EA)’s75 reporting
requirements, primarily due to serial fraudster Pardo’s numerous securi-
ties law violations dating back to 1991, showing he had yet to learn his
lesson on the correct behavior under the securities laws and underscoring
67. Id. ¶ 18.
68. See Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Brief in Support, Life
Partners Holdings 2013, 41 F. Supp. 3d 550 (W.D. Tex. 2013) (No. 1-12-CV-00033), 2013
WL 8373307 (asking dismissal of the claims made to investors in the life settlements based
on the Colorado action, statements that the doctor’s methodology met industry standards,
and the rate of returns).
69. Rule 10b-5 requires the misstatement to be in connection with a purchase or sale
of a security. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011) (“It shall be unlawful . . . (b) [t]o make any
untrue statement of a material fact . . . in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.”).
70. See Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Brief in Support, Life
Partners Holdings 2013, 41 F. Supp. 3d 550 (W.D. Tex. 2013) (No. 1-12-CV-00033), 2013
WL 8373307 (citing only the D.C. Circuit Court opinion, Life Partners 1996, 87 F.3d 536,
545–46 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
71. The district judge used the term cozen. See Life Partners Holdings 2013, 41 F.
Supp. 3d 550, 555 (W.D. Tex. 2013).
72. Mut. Benefits, 408 F.3d 737, 743–44 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[B]oth pre- and post-
purchase managerial activities, . . . should be taken into consideration in determining
whether Howey’s test is satisfied.”).
73. See Life Partners 1996, 87 F.3d at 551–52 (Wald, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Howey test
can be met by pre-purchase managerial activities of a promoter when it is the success of
these activities, either entirely or predominantly, that determines whether profits are even-
tually realized.”).
74. See Life Partners Holdings 2013, 41 F. Supp. 3d 550, 554–56 (W.D. Tex. 2013).
75. See 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2012).
448 SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY [Vol. 2
the lack of oversight by the current board of directors.76 The district court
ordered Life Partners to disgorge $15 million to the SEC for the share-
holders77 and to pay civil penalties78 to the SEC in the amount of $27.7
million for Life Partners’s sixty-eight securities violations, $6.2 million for
Pardo, and $2 million for Peden.79
The travails of these serial fraudsters continue. Life Partners Holdings,
Inc. declared bankruptcy on January 20, 2015, and Life Partners, Inc. did
so on May 19, 2015.80 The purpose of the bankruptcy filing was to substi-
tute a self-selected examiner, favorable to Pardo and Peden, for a district
court-appointed receiver over Life Partners that would investigate any
allegations of fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, misconduct, mismanage-
ment, or irregularity in the management of Life Partners.81 Peden, a li-
censed attorney, had his privilege to practice before the SEC revoked it.82
76. One can but wonder about the efficacy of these permanent injunctions, since
Pardo was already subject to one prohibiting the same reporting violations under the EA
for his securities law violations with a prior public company. See SEC v. Life Partners
Holdings, Inc., 71 F. Supp. 3d 615, 618 (W.D. Tex. 2014) [hereinafter Life Partners Hold-
ings 2014] (mentioning the prior injunction), 625 (enjoining Pardo from aiding and abetting
any violation of § 13(a) of the EA and Rules 12b-20, 13a-1, and 13a-13, the same as the
prior injunction); see also SEC, SEC NEWS DIG. 91-14, FINAL JUDGMENT OF PERMANENT
INJUNCTION AGAINST ASK CORPORATION AND BRIAN PARDO (1991) (enjoining Pardo
from future violations of EA Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 and from future aiding and
abetting of violations of EA 13(a) and Rules 12b-20, 13a-1 and 13a-13).
77. The SEC’s request was for $500 million. See Life Partners Holdings 2014, 71 F.
Supp. 3d at 621. But, there are two sets of victims to Pardo’s fraud: Life Partners’s other
shareholders and those that bought interests in Life Partners’s life settlements. See, e.g.,
Stone v. Life Partners Holdings, Inc., 26 F. Supp. 3d 575, 585 (W.D. Tex. 2014) (deciding a
shareholder class action against Life Partners, Pardo, and Peden for securities fraud for
misrepresenting the financial condition of the company to shareholders in public state-
ments made in filings with the SEC, press releases, and during public conference calls);
Tim Grant, Life Settlements Present a Murky Alternative to Stocks, Bonds, PITTS. POST-
GAZETTE (Sept. 20, 2015), http://www.post-gazette.com/business/money/2015/09/20/Life-
settlements-a-murky-alternative-to-stocks-bonds/stories/201509060011 [https://perma.cc/
4MLL-999Z] (focusing on a retiree that had purchased interests in three life settlements,
receiving a smaller return on one due to the insured living longer than expected and uncer-
tain about the other two due to the bankruptcy filing of Life Partners).
78. The SEC’s request was for $1.5 billion. See Life Partners Holdings 2014, 71 F.
Supp. 3d at 624.
79. See id.; see also SEC v. Life Partners Holdings, Inc., No. A-12-CV-00033 JRN,
2015 WL 433094, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 2, 2015) (denying stay of execution during appeal
for Pardo and Peden, claiming, on the basis of unverified financial statements [possibly
fraudulent since they failed to appear at the hearing on their motion], that they lack suffi-
cient funds to post the required bonds). Pardo and Peden’s appeal is based on the insuffi-
ciency of evidence for the fraud claim and the absence of jury findings to support civil
penalties, not that interests in life settlements are not securities. See Brief of Appellants
Brian D. Pardo and R. Scott Peden at 2, SEC v. Life Partners Holdings, Inc., No. 14-51353
(5th Cir. June 30, 2015), 2015 WL 4055445.
80. See In re Life Partners Holdings, Inc., Docket No. 4:15-BK-40289 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. Jan. 20, 2015).
81. See Objection of the SEC to Debtor’s Motion for Entry of an Order Appointing
Tracy A. Bolt as Examiner with Expanded Powers at 1, In re Life Partners Holdings, Inc.,
No. 15-40289-rfn-11 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.), 2015 WL 513550.
82. See In re R. Scott Peden, Esq., No. 34-75135, 2015 WL 3562620, at *1 (June 9,
2015).
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B. SEPARATION AGREEMENT VESTING STOCK AWARDS IS A
TRANSACTION INVOLVING STOCK UNDER THE TSFA
Litigation under the TSFA dealt with defining its scope. In Ginn v. NCI
Building Systems, Inc.,83 the First Houston Court of Appeals considered
whether a separation agreement that immediately vested previous stock
awards constituted a transaction involving the purchase or sale of stock
under the TSFA and whether the Covenants Not to Compete Act84 pre-
empted the TSFA provision for legal fees.85 A public company had termi-
nated a founder’s son by eliminating his position as executive vice-
president. The separation agreement referred to the vice-president’s res-
ignation and also contained a non-compete provision, a non-solicitation
of company employees provision, and a confidentiality provision. The
vice-president allowed the company to cleanse company data off of his
office computer (retained by him) and his home computer. But, regarding
his resignation as a termination without cause, the vice-president retained
an undisclosed back-up hard-drive containing confidential and proprie-
tary company information, including sales information, pricing data, fi-
nancial records, and customer lists. The separation agreement provided
for subsequent one-year consulting services at the vice-president’s normal
salary and for immediate vesting of his previously granted stock awards.
Some stock awards had a four-year vesting schedule of twenty-five per-
cent per year, while others had a requirement of no vesting until age
sixty-five. Failure to remain in service during these vesting periods would
result in the forfeiture of the stock award.86 After separation, the ex-vice-
president developed several competing entities, solicited company em-
ployees, and used and disclosed the company’s confidential information.
The company brought suit for statutory fraud and legal fees under the
TSFA among other claims.87 The jury found liability for statutory fraud,
along with several other claims,88 and found damages of $360,000, which
was the consulting salary.89 The trial court disregarded the statutory fraud
claim, concluding that the separation agreement was not a transaction
involving stock in a corporation, raised the damages to $1.9 million to
include the value of the stock that vested that the jury claimed had no
83. Ginn v. NCI Bldg. Sys., Inc., 472 S.W.3d 802, 810 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2015, no pet.).
84. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50 (West 2011).
85. Ginn, 472 S.W.3d at 824–25. The other issues dealt with the sufficiency of evidence
for the common law fraud action, whether the court could rescind the agreement, and
whether damages were calculated properly. Id. at 827, 836–37, 842–45.
86. See Appellee’s Response Brief & Cross-Appellant’s Brief at 5, Ginn v. NCI Bldg.
Sys., Inc., 472 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015) (No. 01-12-00502-CV),
2013 WL 4052416.
87. Other claims included breach of contract, common law fraud, breach of fiduciary
duty, and unjust enrichment. See Ginn, 472 S.W.3d at 811.
88. Specifically, the jury found the ex-vice-president liable for common law fraud,
breach of fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment, while the trial court granted the ex-vice-
president a partial summary judgment on the breach of contract claims. Id. at 810.
89. Id. at 820–21.
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value, and denied legal fees.90
The court of appeals noted that the elements of the TSFA claim listed
in the statute are: (1) a transaction involving stock; (2) a false representa-
tion of fact or a false promise made during the transaction; (3) the mak-
ing of the falsity to induce a party into the contract; (4) that party’s
reliance on the falsity; and (5) the reliance lead to the injury.91 The real
estate cases decided under the same TSFA provision92 required an actual
conveyance as a key element of a transaction involving stock.93 Although
most statutory fraud transactions cases involve fraud by the seller, there
have been cases involving fraud by buyers to induce the sale of stock.94
For stock transactions, courts found statutory fraud for transactions trans-
ferring stock options provided that they are vested.95 Because the in-
volved transaction provided for immediate vesting of forfeitable past
90. Id. at 820–22.
91. Id. at 823.
92. The statutory fraud provision also applies to transactions in real estate. See TEX.
BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 27.01 (West 2015) (“Fraud in a transaction involving real estate
or stock in a corporation or joint stock company consists of . . . .”).
93. See Stanfield v. O’Boyle, 462 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Tex. 1971) (finding that an agree-
ment to substitute security for a real estate loan under the predecessor to the TSFA is not a
conveyance but merely a contract to convey in the future); BLM of Brownwood, Inc. v.
Mid-Tex Cellular, Ltd., No. 11-11-00311-CV, 2014 WL 1285765, at *6 (Tex. App.—East-
land Mar. 31, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (finding oral contract invalid because conveyance
does not satisfy the Statute of Frauds); Tukua Inv., LLC v. Spenst, 413 S.W.3d 786, 796–97
(Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, pet. denied) (holding real estate sales contract is a conveyance);
Evans v. Wilkins, No. 14-00-00831-CV, 2001 WL 1340356, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] Aug. 14, 2013, no pet.) (finding real estate joint venture agreements not mentioning
any specific properties are not conveyances); Tex. Commerce Bank Reagan v. Lebco Con-
structors, Inc., 865 S.W.2d 68, 82 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied) (finding
loan agreement for real estate is not a conveyance); see also Life Ins. Co. of Va. v. Murray
Inv. Co., 646 F.2d 224, 227 (5th Cir. 1981) (finding statutory fraud provision inapplicable to
purchase of notes secured by real estate); Burleson State Bank v. Plunkett, 27 S.W.3d 605,
611 (Tex. App.—Waco 2000, pet. denied) (finding statutory fraud provision inapplicable to
construction loan); Nolan v. Bettis, 577 S.W.2d 551, 556 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1979, writ
ref’d n.r.e.) (finding statutory fraud provision inapplicable to purchase of lien note to
foreclose).
94. See Fisher v. Yates, 953 S.W.2d 370, 381 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1997, no writ)
(finding statutory fraud for purchase of minority shareholders stock prior to sale of com-
pany); see also Read v. Cary, 615 S.W.2d 296, 298 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1981, writ ref’d
n.r.e.) (inducing shareholders to sell stock violated statutory fraud provision providing
court jurisdiction).
95. Cf. Wright v. Modern Grp., Ltd., No. 13-12-00293-CV, 2013 W.L. 4714930, at
*9–10 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Aug. 30, 2013, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (finding statutory
fraud inapplicable to phantom equity agreement granting an option for 5% of the company
since condition precedent of 5 years of service was unsatisfied); Beebe v. Compaq Comput.
Corp., 940 S.W.2d 304, 307 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no pet.) (finding statu-
tory fraud inapplicable to stock option plan that suspended vesting of options during leave
of absence when employee never returned from leave of absence); Stephanz v. Laird, 846
S.W.2d 895, 905 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied) (finding statutory fraud
inapplicable to granted stock options since precondition precedent for vesting of 18-
months service was unsatisfied).
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stock awards,96 this requirement for statutory fraud was satisfied.97
But using a separation agreement to vest the stock with a non-compete
provision added an additional issue concerning the successful employer’s
right to legal fees. The TSFA provides for legal fees,98 but the Covenants
Not to Compete Act only allows legal fees for successful employees and
not successful employers.99 The Covenants Not to Compete Act provides
remedies for enforcement of non-compete agreements, but it also
preempts other remedies.100 The employer’s efforts to enforce the non-
compete provisions of the separation agreement with a temporary injunc-
tion and breach of contract lawsuit triggered the Covenants Not to Com-
pete Act and its preemption of legal fees under TSFA.101
C. CONFIRMATION THAT THE TSA IS NOT PRECLUDED FOR FRAUD IN
CONNECTION WITH UNCOVERED SECURITIES
The SLUSA preclusion narrows the scope of the TSA and TSFA by
prohibiting state law class actions with over fifty investors for misrepre-
sentation or omission of a material fact in connection with a sale or
purchase of “covered securities.”102 Covered securities are those traded
on a national exchange or sold, under the Jumpstart Our Business Star-
tups Act (JOBS) amendment, only to accredited persons.103 SLUSA does
not apply to actions by the state, class actions in the state of incorpora-
tion, and state securities commissioners’ enforcement actions.104 The key
significance of SLUSA preclusion involves the inability of victims of se-
curities fraud to recover from aiders and abettors under federal securities
96. The employee’s lawyers had difficulty understanding vesting schedules. They saw
the separation agreement as not involving the sale of stock, claiming the stock awards had
already conveyed the stock. See Appellants’ Reply Brief & Cross-Appellees’ Response
Brief at 16, Brief at 5, Ginn v. NCI Bldg. Sys., Inc., 472 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2015) (No. 01-12-00502-CV), 2013 WL 4052417. Without the immediate vesting,
though, their client would have received far less stock when he his employment termi-
nated, forfeiting the unvested stock.
97. Ginn, 472 S.W.3d at 824.
98. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 27.01(e) (West 2015) (“Any person who vio-
lates the provisions of this section shall be liable to the person defrauded for reasonable
and necessary attorney’s fees . . . .”).
99. See id. § 15.51(a) (enforcement remedies: promisee [employer] may get damages
and injunctive relief); id. § 15.51(c) (defense remedies: promisor [employee] may get costs
and reasonable attorney’s fees).
100. See id. § 15.52 (preemption provision: remedies provided under the act are
exclusive).
101. See id.
102. See 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1)(A) (2012) (“No covered class action based upon the
statutory or common law of any State or subdivision thereof may be maintained in any
State or Federal court by any private party alleging (A) a misrepresentation or omission of
a material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security . . . .”).
103. See § 77r(6)(1) (defining of covered security as one traded on a national exchange
or one determined by SEC rule and registered mutual funds); § 78bb(f)(5)(E) (referring to
the SA definition of covered security); see also § 77r(b)(4)(C) (making sales to only accred-
ited persons covered securities), as amended by Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub.
L. No. 112-106, § 305(a), 126 Stat. 306, 322 (2012).
104. See § 78bb(f)(3)(A)(i) (where incorporated); § 78bb(f)(3)(B)(i) (by state);
§ 78bb(f)(4) (state securities commissioner).
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law,105 while they can under some states’ blue sky laws, including the
TSA.106
In Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice, the victims of Allen Stanford’s
multi-million dollar Ponzi scheme sued the aiders and abettors of the
fraud, some under Louisiana law and some under the TSA.107 They had
purchased certificates of deposit (CDs) of an offshore bank with assets
supposedly invested in a diversified portfolio of marketable securities.
The invested assets were to provide funds for redeeming the CDs when-
ever needed. The Texas victims filed a federal class action against the
bank’s insurance brokers who misrepresented material facts and the
bank’s lawyers who prevented the SEC from uncovering the Ponzi
scheme for aiding and abetting securities fraud under the TSA.108 The
district court noted that the CDs were not covered securities because they
were not registered or traded on a national exchange.109 In the absence of
any Fifth Circuit precedence, the district court adopted the Eleventh Cir-
cuit’s induced and depended upon principle, and determined that the “in
connection with the purchase or sale of covered securities”110 element
was satisfied and dismissed the victims’ TSA lawsuits.111 The U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded.112 The Fifth Cir-
cuit adopted the Ninth Circuit’s test that the fraud and sale of covered
securities be more than tangentially related.113 The U.S. Supreme Court
affirmed under its own test.114
Fearing a narrow interpretation of “in connection with,” the SEC, as
amicus curiae, first opposed the granting of certiorari115 and later sup-
105. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 152, 155
(2008); Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164,
180 (1994).
106. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33(F)(2) (West 2010) (TSA liability for
one who intentionally materially aids a fraudster).
107. Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice, 134 S. Ct. 1058, 1059 (2014). The victims also
brought a claim for civil conspiracy. The federal courts consolidated the TSA cases with
others brought under the Louisiana securities act. See id. at 1065.
108. Id. at 1065.
109. See 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(1).
110. § 78bb(f)(1).
111. See Roland v. Green, 675 F.3d 503, 510 (5th Cir. 2012), aff’d sub nom., Chad-
bourne & Parke LLP v. Troice, 134 S. Ct. 1058 (2014); see also Flint 66, supra note 3, at
1139–41 (discussing Roland, 675 F.3d 503). The CDs backed by covered securities induced
the victims to purchase and the victims sold covered securities to raise money for the
purchase of CDs. See Roland, 675 F.3d at 510.
112. See Roland, 675 F.3d at 524.
113. See Madden v. Cowen & Co., 576 F.3d 957, 966 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Roland,
675 F.3d at 519–20 (adopting the Madden test). Applying this test to the sale of the nonreg-
istered CDs by the insurance brokers, the Fifth Circuit found that the misrepresentation of
a backing by covered securities was only one of eight misrepresentations and therefore
could not be more than tangentially related. Roland, 675 F.3d at 522–23. Similarly, sale by
some investors of marketable securities to buy the CDs from the insurance brokers was
only tangentially related since they could have raised money by other means. Id. at 521–22.
With respect to the aiding and abetting law firm, its obstruction fraud also was not more
than tangentially related. See id. at 511–24.
114. Troice, 134 S. Ct. at 1066.
115. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 2, 7, 22, Chadbourne & Parke
LLP v. Troice, 134 S. Ct. 1058 (2014) (Nos. 12-79, 12-86, 12-88), 2012 WL 6591478. The
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ported the fraudsters and aiders and abettors in their appeal.116 To the
SEC, the Fifth Circuit had misapplied the tangential test because the crux
of the fraud was to convince the investors that the CDs were safe and
backed by a diversified portfolio including marketable securities of stable
national governments, international banks, and multinational companies,
some of which securities were covered securities.117 The SEC desired a
broad interpretation of the “in connection with” requirement, rather than
the tangential test, which would encourage victims to allege numerous
non-securities related fraud allegations to avoid preclusion of their suits
by SLUSA and create a loophole for fraudsters seeking to hamper the
SEC efforts to protect the securities markets from the variety of different
forms of fraud.118
Armed with this concern, the Supreme Court laid out the framework to
determine the reach of SLUSA. The correct test would not limit the
SEC’s ability to prosecute nor preclude the current victims’ state ac-
tions.119 The Supreme Court explained that “[a] fraudulent misrepresen-
tation or omission is not made ‘in connection with’ such a ‘purchase or
sale of a covered security’ unless it is material to a decision by one or
more individuals (other than the fraudster) to buy or to sell a ‘covered
security.’”120 The Supreme Court also noted that the key to this test is
not the absence of the fraudster’s purchase or sale,121 but the presence of
SEC claimed there was no conflict in the circuits concerning the application of SLUSA. See
id. at 8. The Fifth Circuit found differently when it selected which Circuit’s rule to follow.
The Eleventh and Second Circuits use an “induced” test, which the Fifth Circuit rejected as
too narrow by adding a causation requirement. See Roland, 675 F.3d at 519; see also In-
stituto De Prevision Militar v. Merrill Lynch, 546 F.3d 1340, 1349 (11th Cir. 2008) (using an
“induced” test and also adding a “depend” test); Romano v. Kazacos, 609 F.3d 512, 522 (2d
Cir. 2010) (using an “induced” test). The Sixth Circuit uses a “depend on” test, which the
Fifth Circuit rejected as too narrow. See Roland, 675 F.3d at 513; see also Segal v. Fifth
Third Bank, N.A., 581 F.3d 305, 310 (6th Cir. 2009) (using a “depend on” test). The Eighth
and Seventh Circuits use the Supreme Court’s “coincide” test with no useful explanations,
which the Fifth Circuit rejected as too narrow. See Roland, 675 F.3d at 513–14; see also
Siepel v. Bank of Am., N.A., 526 F.3d 1122, 1127 (8th Cir. 2008) (using a “coincide” test);
Gavin v. AT & T Corp., 464 F.3d 634, 639 (7th Cir. 2006) (using a “coincide” test, but more
than “but for”).
116. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 11,
Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice, 134 S. Ct. 1058 (2014) (Nos. 12-79, 12-86, 12-88), 2013
WL 1947418.
117. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 12, Chadbourne & Parke LLP
v. Troice, 134 S. Ct. 1058 (2014) (Nos. 12-79, 12-86, 12-88), 2012 WL 6591478.
118. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 11–12,
Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice, 134 S. Ct. 1058 (2014) (Nos. 12-79, 12-86, 12-88), 2013
WL 1947418.
119. See Troice, 134 S. Ct. at 1062.
120. See id. at 1066.
121. The Supreme Court had previously held SLUSA precludes a state action by those
who retained their shares due to the fraud since the fraudster was trading with others in the
market. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 85 (2006).
Similarly, under 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011), the Supreme Court had allowed a criminal
action against a fraudster for trading on inside information stolen from an issuer since the
fraudster was trading with others in the market. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S.
642, 651–53 (1997).
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fraud about a covered security.122 The Supreme Court supported this test
with several reasons besides the plain meaning of the statute’s language.
SLUSA’s purpose was to shield issuers of covered securities, not uncov-
ered securities, from state class actions.123 Every Supreme Court case that
had found fraud in connection with a security involved a victim who had
bought, sold, or maintained ownership of that security.124 Similarly, the
underlying regulatory statutes, the SA and the EA, also deal with fraud in
the buying and selling of securities.125 And to interpret “in connection
with” more broadly would interfere with state regulation of ordinary
frauds where the fraudster intends later to invest in exchange-traded se-
curities or to pool mortgages into covered securities.126
The Chadbourne & Parke case did produce a dissent that the majority
regarded as an error.127 The dissent would effectively abolish the distinc-
tion between covered and uncovered securities. Focusing more on main-
taining the integrity of the marketplace128 than on antifraud, the dissent
would more severely limit class actions to federal law, not state law.129
The reason: to eliminate “complex and costly state-law litigation based on
allegations of aiding or participating in transactions that are in fact regu-
lated by the federal securities laws.”130 The dissent viewed the failure to
understand the Congressional purpose was to protect shareholders of the
122. See Troice, 134 S. Ct. at 1066–68.
123. Victims’ lawyers were circumventing the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 1995 (PLSRA) by providing heightened pleading standards enforced by automatic stays
against discovery through state class actions. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-803, 10th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1, 13 (1998); 144 CONG. REC. S4799 (daily ed. May 13, 1998) (statement of Sen. Lie-
berman), https://www.congress.gov/crec/1998/05/13/CREC-1998-05-13-pt1-PgS4778-3.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X8QP-ENWT]; 144 CONG. REC. H10780 (Oct. 13, 1998) (statement of
Rep. Eshoo), https://www.congress.gov/crec/1998/10/13/CREC-1998-10-13-pt1-PgH10771-
2.pdf [https://perma.cc/9CBT-KPZH]; see also 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1 (2012) (providing private
securities litigation for the Securities Act); § 78u-4 (providing the same for the Exchange
Act). Congress also wanted to preserve state regulation for non-covered securities. See S.
REP. NO. 105-182, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 8 (1998).
124. See Dabit, 547 U.S. at 77 (involving holders of overvalued stock from the fraud-
sters actions); SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 822 (2002) (involving a client’s securities
sold by broker with discretion for broker’s personal use); Wharf Holdings Ltd. v. United
Int’l Holdings Inc., 532 U.S. 588, 592 (2001) (involving a company purchased oral option to
purchase 10% of stock by company with no intent to honor the option); O’Hagan, 521 U.S.
at 655–56 (involving a lawyer’s use of inside information to purchase options on target
company that harmed the investing public); Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y.C. v. Bankers
Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 10 (1971) (involving an insurance company damaged when
outside collaborators, corporate officer, and controlling shareholder stripped company of
its treasury bonds).
125. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77q (SA’s antifraud provision § 17), 78j(b) (EA’s antifraud provi-
sion §10(b)).
126. See Troice, 134 S. Ct. at 1068.
127. Id. at 1072 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
128. See id. at 1074 (“SLUSA seeks to preclude a broad range of state law securities
claims in order to protect those who advise, counsel, and otherwise assist investors from
abusive and multiplicitous class actions designed to extract settlements from defendants
vulnerable to litigation costs. This, in turn, protects the integrity of the markets.”).
129. See id. at 1075 (“Congress intended to make, ‘federal law, not state law, . . . the
principal vehicle for asserting class-action securities fraud claims.’”).
130. Id. at 1074 (“[The majority opinion] will subject many persons and entities whose
profession it is to give advice, counsel, and assistance in investing in the securities markets
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extorted issuers, not those feeding off the fraudsters.131 The dissent would
use a rule that finds “in connection with” when the misrepresentation
coincides with the purchase or sale of a covered security.132 Because the
promise to buy covered securities was so essential to the fraud of selling
the CDs, the dissent would find the coincide test satisfied and reverse the
Fifth Circuit, thereby denying the victims of a remedy under both federal
law and state law.133
Chadbourne & Parke is not likely to have a great impact on securities
law. Few class actions are for uncovered securities that are in some way
related to covered securities. The major uncovered securities are U.S. se-
curities not traded on a national exchange (such as private placements
other than those made only to accredited persons)134 and foreign stocks
and bonds traded outside the United States. Following Chadbourne &
Parke, the other major Ponzi scheme, Bernard Madoff’s sale of British
Virgin Islands mutual funds that were invested in covered securities, has
produced two cases against aiders and abettors.135 Those cases, however,
did not survive SLUSA preclusion because the investors intended to indi-
rectly invest in covered securities.136 Still, lawyers, accountants, and fi-
nancial advisers may want to improve their internal controls to avoid
potential problems when representing fraudsters if they are dealing with
non-covered securities.
Meanwhile, the Chadbourne & Parke saga continues with the district
court dismissing some TSA actions as beyond the three-year statute of
limitations and dismissing the negligent supervision claim over the errant
lawyer who hindered the SEC investigation because Texas does not rec-
ognize a duty of care to third parties.137
II. REGISTRATION AND ENFORCEMENT
The TSA created the TSSB to handle the registrations required by the
TSA and to serve as an enforcement agency.138 The basic rule of most
securities laws is that securities must be registered with their correspond-
ing regulatory agency unless they fall within an exemption.139 Similarly,
to complex and costly state-law litigation based on allegations of aiding or participating in
transactions that are in fact regulated by the federal securities laws.”).
131. Id. at 1079; see infra note 245 and accompanying text for the purpose behind the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 whose evasion required SLUSA.
132. See Troice, 134 S. Ct. at 1078; see also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v.
Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 85 (2006) (enunciating the coincide rule).
133. See Troice, 134 S. Ct. at 1078.
134. See 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(C) (2012) (finding that sales to only accredited persons
are covered securities), as amended by Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS), Pub.
L. No. 112-106, § 305(a), 126 Stat. 306, 322 (2012).
135. See In re Kingate Mgmt. Ltd. Litig., 784 F.3d 128, 142 (2d Cir. 2015); In re Herald,
753 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, Davis v. Kohn, 135 S. Ct. 1701 (2015).
136. See In re Kingate Mgmt. Ltd. Litig., 784 F.3d at 142; In re Herald, 753 F.3d at 113.
137. See Troice v. Proskauer Rose LLP, No. 3:09-CV-1600-N, 2015 WL 1219522, at
*6–7, *12–13 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 4, 2015), rev’d, 816 F.3d 341 (5th Cir. 2015).
138. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-1 (West 2010).
139. See id. art. 581-7(A).
456 SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY [Vol. 2
unless they fit an exemption from registration, sellers of securities must
register before selling securities in the state, and investment advisers must
register before rendering investment advice in the state.140 Enforcement
actions generally focus on issuers failing to register their securities and
simultaneously on their selling agents making misleading statements to
aid their sales.
A. ISSUER SECURITIES
The recent financial crisis spawned an interest in a possible new
method of offering securities: crowdfunding. The issue for the TSSB is to
establish the conditions that allow exemption from registration for the
securities offered through crowdfunding. New business ventures use
crowdfunding to raise money from a large number of investors through
an online portal, frequently using social media to direct people to the
portal.141 Early efforts provided a product or service in exchange for the
money (such as Kickstarter founded in 2009);142 later efforts provided
securities to accredited investors (such as AngelList founded in 2010).143
Accredited persons, among other entities, are those humans with net as-
sets over $1 million or an income for two years, plus an expected third
year, over $200,000 (with spouse over $300,000).144 Crowdfunding propo-
nents hope to democratize these efforts by permitting unaccredited inves-
tors to participate in funding startup companies and hopefully reap a
reward if the startup succeeds.145
To encourage new small business ventures and to take advantage of the
populace’s penchant for gambling, Congress passed the JOBS Act in 2012
to facilitate the raising of money through crowdfunding by requiring the
SEC to take certain actions timely.146 Seeing its mission as protecting in-
vestors, the SEC took a slow approach.147 Title II of the JOBS Act re-
quired the SEC to amend Rule 506 to permit accredited persons to invest
through crowdfunding within ninety days of the act; the SEC acted a year
later.148 Title IV of the JOBS Act required the SEC to provide a new
140. See id. art. 581-13(A).
141. Adam Heitzman, How Crowdfunding is Changing The Way Startups Raise Money,
INC. (Jan. 20, 2015), http://www.inc.com/adam-heitzman/how-crowdfunding-is-changing-
the-way-startups-raise-money.html [https://perma.cc/C2DW-9GM4].
142. KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/about?ref=nav [https://perma.cc/4EZ7-
BFM4] (last visited Sept 3, 2016).
143. Syndicates/For Founders, ANGELLIST, https://angel.co/syndicates/founders [https://
perma.cc/Z2TZ-QB68] (last visited Sept. 3, 2016).
144. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2011); see also 15 U.S.C. § 77b(15) (2012).
145. Chance Barnett, SEC Approves Title III of JOBS Act, Equity Crowdfunding with
Non-Accrediteds, FORBES (Oct. 30, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/chancebarnett/2015/
10/30/sec-approves-title-iii-of-jobs-act-equity-crowdfunding-with-non-accredited/
#3fcd7d966535 [https://perma.cc/6H28-4WLZ].
146. See JOBS, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012).
147. SEC, THE INVESTOR’S ADVOCATE: HOW THE SEC PROTECTS INVESTORS, MAIN-
TAINS MARKET INTEGRITY, AND FACILITATES CAPITAL FORMATION, https://www.sec.gov/
about/whatwedo.shtml [https://perma.cc/ZHK2-WL8L] (last visited Sept. 3, 2016).
148. See JOBS, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 201, 126 Stat. 306, 313; see also 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.506(c) (the amended rule removing the prohibition against general advertising for
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exemption for small issues, for which the SEC revised Regulation A al-
lowing investment by accredited and unaccredited persons.149 This is not
overly helpful. Regulation A is so onerous that Regulation A filings
dropped from 116 in 1997 to 19 in 2011, and the number of Regulation A
filings becoming qualified dropped from 57 in 1998 to 1 in 2011, princi-
pally because of the costs in preparing the disclosure documents for the
SEC and various state regulatory bodies, including Texas,150 and the re-
quirement for audited financials.151 Title III of the JOBS Act required
the SEC to issue rules providing an exemption from registration for
crowdfunding within 270 days of the act; the SEC acted after several
years at the end of the current review period.152
In this absence of SEC action, the TSSB153 decided to create its own
sales to accredited investors, thereby permitting crowdfunding); 78 Fed. Reg. 44771-01
(July 24, 2013) (adopting the amendment July 24, 2013, effective Sept. 23, 2013).
149. See JOBS, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 401, 126 Stat. 306, 323; see generally 17 C.F.R.
§§ 230.251–.263 (Regulation A as amended for the new exemption). The amendment pro-
vides for a Tier I offering under $20 million and a Tier II offering under $50 million, both
in a twelve month period to both accredited and unaccredited investors with affiliate sales
limited to 30%. Affiliates are those in control of the issuer. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.405. The
issuers must be organized in the United States or Canada, not be public companies, not be
no purpose shell companies, not be selling asset-backed securities or mineral interests, not
be subject to a SEC order within the last five years, have filed all required reports in the
last two years, and do not have a Regulation A bad actor. See generally 17 C.F.R.
§§ 230.251–230.263. Tier II offerings, but not Tier I offerings, are exempt from state law,
must provide audited financials, and file periodic reports with the SEC. 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.251.
150. See 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 113.1 (2016) (requiring a regular registration for Regu-
lation A offerings since there are a federal exemption and cannot be done by
coordination).
151. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-751, SECURITIES REGULA-
TION: FACTORS THAT MAY AFFECT TRENDS IN REGULATION A OFFERINGS (2012), http://
www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-839 [https://perma.cc/6M2Q-W869]. The author did a Reg-
ulation A offering for American Solar King Corporation in 1980 and found it just as bur-
densome as a registration and only used it since at that time it required one year of audited
financials, not three as with a registration, and the issuer only had one year of audited
financials, the prior year’s financials being qualified. An offering statement replaces the
registration statement. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.252. An offering circular replaces the prospec-
tus. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.253. But note that the amended Regulation A has removed the
requirement of audited financials for Tier I offerings and preempted state law for Tier II
offerings. See 17 C.F.R. § 239.90, Form 1-A, Part II-Information Required in Offering Cir-
cular, Part F/S (b) (no audited financial statements for Tier I offerings required) & (c)
(audited financial statement for Tier II offerings required) (2011), https://www.sec.gov/
about/forms/form1-a.pdf [https://perma.cc/6GN8-DNMU]; 17 C.F.R. § 230.257 (only Tier
II offerings are subject to audited financials in periodic reports).
152. See JOBS, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302(c), 126 Stat. 306, 318; SEC, No. 15-249, SEC
ADOPTS RULES TO PERMIT CROWDFUNDING (Oct. 30, 2015); see also Crowdfunding, Secur-
ities Act Release No. 9470, Exchange Act Release No. 70741, 2013 WL 5770346 (Oct. 23,
2013) (proposed rules on the crowdfunding exemption); 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6) (2012) (pro-
viding a crowdfunding exemption for registered issuers through registered portals of not
more than $1 million in a twelve month period, unaccredited investors invest no more than
$2000 or 5% of their annual income or net worth, whichever is larger, if under $100,000
and 10% if over $100,000); § 77d-1 (laying out the requirements for registered portals and
issuers).
153. Texas is not the only state to take this approach. See NORTH AMERICAN SECURI-
TIES ADMINISTRATORS ASSOCIATION (NASAA), State Crowdfunding Update: National
Conference of State Legislatures 2015 Legislative Summit (2015), at 1, 6, http://
www.ncsl.org/documents/summit/summit2015/onlineresources/crowdfund-
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exemption for crowdfunding,154 along with registration of the trading
portals155 and a permission for small business issuers (if their previous
securities sales do not exceed $1 million and the registration is for less
than $5 million) to use financials reviewed by a certified public account-
ant rather than audited ones.156 The exemption from registration will fa-
cilitate the capital raising efforts of Texas small businesses by diverting
through crowdfunding some gambling monies from the Texas Lottery (it-
self a diversion of gambling monies to support public schools),157 the
Kickapoo Lucky Eagle Casino, pari-mutuel wagering, fantasy football,
and out of state casinos. The TSSB based its crowdfunding exemption,
effective November 17, 2014,158 on the intrastate exemption from federal
registration.159 Consequently, the gambler/investor must be a Texas resi-
dent (evidenced by a driver’s license, voter registration, or property tax
record); the issuer must be organized in Texas; 80% of the issuer’s gross
revenue, assets, and net proceeds must be in Texas; and resale of the se-
curities is restricted to Texas residents for nine months.160 The exemption
provides a funds raised limit of $1 million in a twelve-month period,161 a
bad actor disqualification,162 sales through a registered dealer or por-
tal,163 a $5000 investment limit for an unaccredited investor,164 an escrow
ing_101_update_coverman.pdf [https://perma.cc/AG56-G5YJ] (listing states with intrastate
crowdfunding exemptions as of Aug. 1, 2015: Ala., Ariz., Ga., Id., Ind., Kans., Ken., Me.,
Md., Mass., Mich., Miss., Mont., Ore., S.C., Tenn., Tex., Vt., Va., Wash., and Wis.).
154. See 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 133.15–133.17 (West 2016) (Forms for the exemp-
tion); id. § 139.25 (intrastate crowdfunding exemption)). In 2010, the Texas legislature en-
tered the crowdfunding arena by mandating that the TSSB provide an exemption from
registration for crowdfunding by certain public and nonprofit entities. See TEX. REV. CIV.
STAT. ANN. art. 581-44 (West 2010), see also Act of June 17, 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., ch. 652,
§ 1, 2015 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 652 (West) (making the amendment). The public entities are
municipal corporations, those created by municipalities under the government code, the
Texas Veterans’ Commission, a nonprofit community development financial institution,
and a nonprofit organization authorized by the federal government to distribute housing
and community development block grants. The Texas legislature also exempted ABLE
accounts, a savings vehicle for disabled children under the Internal Revenue Code, by de-
fining them not to be securities. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 54.907 (West 2012), see also
Act of June 19, 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., ch. 1213, § 2, 2015 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1213 (West)
(making the amendment).
155. See 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 115.1 (definition of crowdfunding portal), 115.3 (ex-
amination waiver for portal), 115.19 (crowdfunding financial portal registration)).
156. See id. § 113.5 (without comment).
157. See TEXAS LOTTERY, http://www.txlottery.org/export/sites/lottery/About_Us/in-
dex.html [https://perma.cc/3LDP-QKTL] (last visited Sept. 3, 2016).
158. 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 139.25.
159. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.147.
160. Compare 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 139.25(a) (Texas purchasers), (b) (issuer organi-
zation in Texas and 80% requirements in Texas), & (k) (nine month resale restriction to
Texans), with 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(c) (issuer’s organization state and 80% requirements),
(d) (purchasers of that state), & (e) (nine month resale restriction to that state). The resale
restriction is virtually meaningless since generally there is no secondary market for startup
issuers.
161. 7 TEX ADMIN. CODE § 139.25(d).
162. Id. § 139.25(m).
163. Id. § 139.25(a).
164. Id. § 139.25(e).
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requirement for funds raised until the minimum amount is raised,165 in-
formation (e.g. risk factors, description of business, operations, and man-
agement, financials certified by the chief executive officer) disclosed on
the portal for twenty-one days before the sale, and communications with
investors only through the portal.166
By June 2015, the TSSB had approved eight crowdfunding portals.167
The portals specialize in specific types of industry such as small business
loans, restaurants, and energy companies, and connect the issuers, who
set a campaign target and funding deadline, with local investors.168 To
raise revenue, these portals charge fees to both the issuers and inves-
tors.169 During the waiting period, the issuer’s executives answer ques-
tions from investors through the online website.170 The trend is to follow
the crowdfunding that has attracted accredited and institutional investors.
Some portals attract investors through creative deals. For example, one
Houston portal’s first deal involved a loan to a hair salon, with the issuer
sweetening the security with gift certificates for their services to increase
business, the amount dependent on the amount loaned.171 According to
one San Antonio registered portal, real estate deals presently
predominate.172 Despite the increased accessibility, a Fort Worth finan-
cial planner thought an average person examining the disclosure docu-
ments would be lost.173
The TSSB cautions the newly permitted unaccredited gambler/inves-
tors that only one-third to one-half of startup businesses survive their first
year and that the venture capital companies only make money by invest-
ing in numerous startups so that the ones that succeed produce lucrative
enough returns to outweigh the failures.174 Consequently, these newly
permitted unaccredited gambler/investors could seriously dent their bank
165. Id. § 139.25(f).
166. Id. § 139.25(i).
167. R. Jason Pierce, Texas Crowdfunding Portals Provide Texas Businesses New Ac-
cess to Investment Dollars, SUMMER NEWSLETTER 2015 (Bus. Law Section of the State Bar
of Tex.), July 2015, at 7, 7, http://web1.amchouston.com/flexshare/003/BusinessLaw/2015/
BusinessLawSection_Summer2015_Newsletter.pdf [https://perma.cc/AFV9-24XD].
168. Id. at 7–9.
169. Id.
170. C. Todd Gibson et al., Joining the Crowd: SEC Adopts Final Crowdfunding Regu-
lation – Part II – Issuers (Nov. 19, 2015), http://www.klgates.com/joining-the-crowd-sec-
adopts-final-crowdfunding-regulations—part-ii—issuers-11-19-2015/ [https://perma.cc/
HKG2-7KT5].
171. See Andrea Rumbaugh, Crowdfunding by Texans for Texans Takes Hold, HOUS.
CHRONICLE (June 18, 2015), www.houstonchronicle.com/business/article/Crowdfunding-
by-Texans-for-Texans-takes-hold-6336673.php/ [https://perma.cc/P5GM-9H9U].
172. See Teresa Mcusic, Texas Investors Can Now Turn to Offers On Crowdfunding




174. TEX. STATE SEC. BD., INFORMATION FOR INVESTORS: CROWD WISDOM OR THE
‘MADNESS OF CROWDS’? (Nov. 7, 2014), https://www.ssb.texas.gov/texas-securities-act-
board-rules/texas-intrastate-crowdfunding/information-investors [https://perma.cc/3VFN-
PDZF].
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accounts by putting $5000 into several offerings, all of which could fail.175
B. MARKET OPERATORS
One common feature of state regulation of securities is the usual re-
quirement to register as a seller of securities before selling securities in
the state, and to register as an investment adviser before rendering in-
vestment advice.176 Registration infractions generally surface when ap-
plying or reapplying for registration. The TSSB created two exemptions
from registration by market operators: one for mergers and acquisition
dealers177 and one for investment advisors to private funds.178 Both ex-
emptions were created to conform with actions by the SEC.
The SEC issued a no-action letter in 2014 for mergers and acquisition
brokers who only purchase, sell, exchange, issue, repurchase, or redeem
securities or assets of a privately-held company (not required to register
under the EA) to a buyer that would actively operate the former pri-
vately-held company or its business with its assets, provided that the bro-
ker had no power to bind the parties, would not provide financing, would
not have any custody of any assets, would not engage in any public offer-
ing, would provide written disclosure of who he represents, would not
participate in a group of buyers, and had not been barred by the SEC or
any state agency or suspended from associating with a broker-dealer.179
Intending to follow the federal guidance, the Texas exemption from regis-
tration for merger and acquisition dealers for privately-held companies
includes a more comprehensive bad person disqualification and also re-
quires the dealer to maintain records (failure results in loss of the exemp-
tion) and furnish them to the TSSB upon request.180
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
mandated registration with the SEC of investment advisors to private
funds with assets under management of over $150 million and gave the
SEC discretion for registration of mid-sized private fund advisors.181 Be-
cause the federal Investment Advisor Act preempts state law for those
175. See id.
176. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-13(A) (West 2010).
177. 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 139.27 (West 2016).
178. Id. § 139.23.
179. See SEC, M & A BROKERS, SEC NO-ACTION LETTER (Jan. 31, 2014). No-action
letters do not bar any private right of action. The problem was created by the Supreme
Court when it ruled that the sale of an entire business was a securities transaction. See
Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985).
180. See 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 139.27 (adding bad person disqualifications for felony
conviction for securities fraud, injunction for securities fraud, postal fraud, and administra-
tive orders for securities fraud, all within the last five years)).
181. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 403, 125 Stat. 1376, 1571 (eliminating the prior exemption for private fund advi-
sors with less than 15 clients), § 408, 125 Stat. 1376, 1575 (2010) (adding an exemption for
private fund advisors with less than $150 million in assets under management and authoriz-
ing the SEC to also register mid-sized private fund advisors); see also 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(m)
(under $150 exemption), (n) (mid-size registration), (b) (2012) (the prior law’s under 15
client exemption).
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registered under the Investment Advisor Act,182 the TSSB amended its
exemption for investment advisors to private funds to coordinate with the
SEC’s new rules permitting registration of those investment advisors to
private funds with over $100 million in assets under management:183 an
exemption for investment advisors not registered with the SEC and no-
tice filings for those so registered.184
Under the Texas legislature’s mandate, the TSSB also amended its
rules to permit expedited registration as dealers and investment advisors
for military spouses if already licensed in another jurisdiction and for mil-
itary service members and veterans by providing them with credit for
comparable service in the military.185 Additionally, the Texas legislature
repealed the additional fees for dealer and investment advisor registra-
tion, a portion of which went to the school fund.186
C. ENFORCEMENT
The TSSB generally enforces its requirements for registration through
emergency orders.187 Because con artists exploit current news and tech-
nology to confound unwary investors, the TSSB enumerates among the
top ten threats to investors: Unregistered dealers, because investors do
not know about the information available from the registration require-
ment; life settlements, because there is no way to reliably predict an indi-
vidual’s life expectancy; digital currency and private placements because
both are not regulated; use of social media on which it is easier to lie than
in print; high yield notes because investors cannot evaluate credit worthi-
ness; and oil and gas deals since investors can’t investigate the claim.188
The TSSB’s actions focus on these threats.
182. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a(b)(1) (2012).
183. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 275.203(m)-1 (the over $150 million exemption) & 275.203A-1
(2011) (mid-size permission to register if between $100 million and $110 million).
184. See 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 109.6, 139.23.
185. See id. §§ 115.18 (dealers), 116.18 (investment advisors), & 133.4 (filing form)
(West 2016); see also Act of May 18, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., S.B. No. 162 (the Chris Kyle
Bill: mandating the expedited registration). The TSSB also modernized its procedures. The
TSSB eliminated its requirement to send its delinquency and comment letters by U.S. mail
and recognized email as an alternative method of communication with applicants. See 7
TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 104.4 (securities), 104.5 (West 2016) (dealers and investment advi-
sors)). The TSSB authorized electronic filings of Form D for filings in coordination with
federal Rule 506. See id. § 107.2; see also 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2011). The TSSB authorized
open records requests without a form and provided for a response in electronic form. See 7
TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 101.4, 133.1. It authorized the use of email in notice and compliance
for rule making. Id. § 103.2 (notice). The TSSB also created a form to assist financial of-
ficers in dealer registrations and investment advisor registrations, and in certifying financial
statements. See id. §§ 115.2 (dealer registrations), 133.18 (investment advisor registrations),
116.2 (certifying financial statements).
186. See Act of June 15, 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., ch. 448, § 31, 2015 Tex. Seess. Law Serv.
448 (West) (repealing TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-41 (West 2010)).
187. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-23.
188. See TEX. ST. SEC. BD., TEXAS SECURITIES REGULATOR IDENTIFIES TOP 10 INVES-
TOR THREATS (Nov. 17, 2014), https://www.ssb.texas.gov/news-publications/investor-alert-
texas-securities-regulator-identifies-top-10-investor-threats [https://perma.cc/ZR28-FESP]
(also listing real estate deals).
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1. Review of TSSB Orders
One TSSB enforcement action, dealing with another of the fraudsters’
favorite fraud, life settlements, reached the court of appeals.189 In AGAP
Life Offerings LLC v. Texas State Securities Board,190 the TSSB issued a
temporary cease and desist order against a seller of life settlements for
selling the unregistered securities through unregistered dealers as well as
omitting material facts and making misleading statements.191 This fraud-
ster coupled the interest in the life settlement with a maturity bond to
offer some protection against a longer than expected lifetime. AGAP
challenged the order and requested a hearing.192 After the hearing, the
TSSB issued a modified cease and desist order retaining the prohibitions
against selling unregistered securities through unregistered dealers. Two
weeks later AGAP filed a motion for rehearing, waited forty-five days,
and when the TSSB did not act on the rehearing, filed in district court.
The TSSB filed a plea to the jurisdiction because the suit was not timely
filed.193 The district court granted the plea.194
The Austin Court of Appeals noted that the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA) provides for petition filing within thirty days after the order
becomes final195 and that the order becomes final when the agency over-
rules the motion for rehearing or after forty-five days.196 Under these
rules, AGAP’s petition was timely filed. Unfortunately for AGAP, the
TSA has a different procedure: Emergency TSSB cease and desist orders
become final and non-appealable within thirty days unless the subject of
the order requests a hearing,197 in which event the TSSB must have a
hearing and the subsequent order is immediately final for purposes of
enforcement and appeal.198 Thus, the APA requires the petition against
the TSSB order to be filed within thirty days of the issuance of that subse-
quent order.199
AGAP’s arguments to escape this result fared no better than its fraud.
First, AGAP contended that the APA’s rehearing requirement applies
189. See generally AGAP Life Offerings LLC v. Tex. State Sec. Bd., No. 03-11-00535-
CV, 2013 WL 6464537 (Tex. App.—Austin Nov. 26, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.).
190. Id.
191. See In re AGAP Life Offerings, LLC, Charles D. Madden and Matthew Searle,
No. ENF-11-CDO-1697, 2011 WL 280998, at *5 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Jan. 20, 2011) (Order
Modifying Emergency Cease and Desist Order: not to sell until the securities are registered
and the sellers are registered); see also In re AGAP Life Offerings, LLC, Charles D. Mad-
den and Mathew Searle, No. ENF-10-CDO-1687, 2010 WL 1420226, at *3 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd.
Apr. 5, 2010) (Emergency Cease and Desist Order: omissions including the principal’s
prior bankruptcy leading to the total loss of investors’ funds, the amount of premium pay-
ments if the insured lived beyond his calculated life expectancy, the risk if the co-investors
did not contribute their pro-rata portion of additional premiums).
192. AGAP Life Offerings LLC, 2013 WL 6464537, at *2.
193. Id. at *1.
194. Id.
195. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.176(a) (West 2008).
196. See id. §§ 2001.144(a)(2), 146(c).
197. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-23-2(C) (West 2010).
198. See id. art. 581-23-2(D), (E).
199. AGAP Life Offerings LLC, 2013 WL 6464537, at *1.
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unless the agency’s governing statutes provide otherwise. The TSA, how-
ever, clearly provides otherwise.200 Next, AGAP contended that if there
was a conflict between the APA and the TSA, the APA governed. The
law, however, is the exact opposite.201 The court of appeals also noted
that the APA provided that if there is a conflict between a general provi-
sion and a more specific provision (such as the one in the TSA), the more
specific governs.202 Further, the court of appeals noted that the TSA pro-
vision was passed after the APA provision, reflecting the legislative in-
tent.203 The moral of the AGAP story: Oppose a TSSB order, and hire a
lawyer that knows the TSSB procedures.
2. Unregistered Securities
The TSSB also took several enforcement actions against issuers for fail-
ure to register their non-exempt securities and selling agents.204 Because
sales to only accredited persons are covered securities and not subject to
state registration due to preemption,205 all these actions also involved
failures to verify the accreditation of the investors. These serial fraudsters
generally advertised on the Internet and failed to disclose the risks of
their investment schemes, the details of their investments, and their prior
securities law disciplinary histories.
Several unregistered schemes involved oil and gas interests in Texas,
Kansas, and Louisiana sold by convicted felons with prior securities law
violations wrongly claiming years of oilfield experience.206 Others in-
200. Id. at *3–4.
201. The APA provides that its appeal rule applies unless otherwise provided by stat-
ute. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.176(b) (West 2008); see also Tex. Nat. Res. Conser-
vation Comm’n v. Sierra Club, 70 S.W.3d 809, 812 (Tex. 2002).
202. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.026.
203. AGAP Life Offerings LLC, 2013 WL 6464537, at *5.
204. See generally In re Petro-San Res., LLC, No. ENF-15-CDO-1739, 2015 WL
3939933 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. June 22, 2015); In re Lonestar Mineral Assets, LLC, No. ENF-
15-CDO-1738, 2015 WL 1412408 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Mar. 25, 2015); In re Quixote Xplora-
tion, LLC, No. ENF-14-CDO-1736, 2014 WL 5426357 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Oct. 20, 2014); In
re James Dean French & Morning Tower, Ltd., No. ENF-14-CDO-1732, 2014 WL 1758086
(Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Apr. 28, 2014).
205. 17 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(C) (2012) (the JOBS Act provision including sales to only
accredited persons in definition of “covered securities” for which state law is preempted).
206. See generally In re Petro-San Res., LLC, 2015 WL 3939933 (involving a fraudster’s
nondisclosure of a 2005 felony conviction for promotion of a pyramid scheme in Texas, a
pending misdemeanor driving while intoxicated charge, a pending misdemeanor assault
with bodily injury charge, and cease and desist orders in Pennsylvania and Georgia, both
for violating securities laws; ordered to stop selling unregistered securities and committing
fraud); In re Lonestar Mineral Assets, LLC, 2015 WL 1412408 (involving no disclosure of
an absence of registration to do business in Texas, a 1997 SEC disgorgement judgment of
$1.2 million along with an injunction against securities fraud, and a restitution judgment of
$7.6 million, along with a jail term for securities fraud; ordered to stop selling unregistered
securities and committing fraud); In re Quixote Xploration, LLC, 2014 WL 5426357 (in-
volving no disclosure of convictions in Florida for grand theft in 2000 with 33 months in
jail, dealing in stolen property, and securities fraud sentenced to 98 months in jail and
restitution of $620,000); In re James Dean French & Morning Tower, Ltd., 2014 WL
1758086 (involving no disclosure of two theft convictions, a tax lien, and civil securities
fraud lawsuit against the principal and Railroad Commission actions for failure to plug a
well and meet inactive well requirements, and two civil securities fraud lawsuits).
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volved high interest rate promissory notes sold by serial fraudsters with
prior securities law violations or business judgments wrongly claiming the
notes were risk free.207
Joint Venture Group sold a binary options program over the Internet
advertised on Craigslist.208 Binary options, a pure gambling play, offer a
payout of a specified amount or nothing if the underlying security closes
at a specified expiration time above or below a specified price.209 The
SEC believes binary options provide opportunities for fraud.210 The in-
vestors would have their moneys invested by professional traders receiv-
ing a 25% commission and were required to sign “a contract . . . waiv[ing]
[all] causes of action based on any inaccurate representations, breach of
warranty or loss of property.”211 The serial fraudsters guaranteed to
double the investor’s account (guaranteed up to $250,000) in ninety days
(and if not, to refund up to 200% of the investment) and to increase the
account ten-fold in one year allowing retirement in two years.212 The se-
rial fraudsters failed to disclose the identity or qualifications of the trad-
ers, the entity insuring the accounts, the source of funds for the refunds,
the true name of the principal (a convicted felon), the voidness of the
contract waiving liability,213 and the securities law disciplinary proceed-
ings starting in 2006.214
EcoEnergy Group operated a Ponzi scheme by offering investments in
intermodal shipping containers and leasing them to third parties, guaran-
teeing the investors 13% annualized returns, payable monthly or quar-
terly.215 These fraudsters failed to disclose the risks associated with
207. See generally In re Woodbridge Mortg. Inv. Fund 3, LLC, No. ENF-15-DCO-1740,
2015 WL 4515161 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. July 17, 2015) (involving no disclosure of no doing
business in Texas registration and an order by securities commissioner of Massachusetts, a
2001 lawsuit by the SEC in Oregon, and an investor lawsuit in Georgia, all for securities
fraud; ordered to stop selling unregistered securities through unregistered dealers and
committing fraud); In re FlippingYourMoney.com, No. ENF-14-CDO-1734, 2014 WL
2709467 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. June 10, 2014) (involving no disclosure of a 2012 Texas judgment
for failure to repay a $500,000 loan, and a $90,000 Louisiana judgment for failure to pay on
a lease; ordered to stop selling unregistered securities and committing fraud).
208. See In re Clifton Curtis Sneed, Jr., No. ENF-14-CDO-1737, 2014 WL 7284373, at
*1–5 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Dec. 11, 2014) (involving no disclosure of a 2006 order by the
securities commissioner of Utah, a criminal conviction in Utah with a five year probated
sentence and restitution of $92,000, and a SEC action with disgorgement of $1.2 million, all
for securities fraud, and a federal tax lien for $530,000; ordered to stop selling unregistered
securities through unregistered dealers and committing fraud).
209. See OFFICE OF INVESTOR EDUCATION AND ADVOCACY, SEC, INVESTOR ALERT:
BINARY OPTIONS AND FRAUD, www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/ia_binary.pdf [https://perma.cc/
75RN-Z73C] (last visited Sept. 25, 2016).
210. See id.
211. See In re Clifton Curtis Sneed, Jr., 2014 WL 7284373, at *4.
212. See id. at *2.
213. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33(L) (West 2010).
214. In re Clifton Curtis Sneed, Jr., 2014 WL 7284373, at *2–3.
215. See generally In re EcoEnergy Grp., Inc., No. ENF-13-CDO-1730, 2013 WL
6840199 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Dec. 19, 2013) (involving no disclosure of principal’s 2005 bank-
ruptcy, four tax liens, a judgment of $3.8 million for trademark infringement, and a $1
million judgment for bankruptcy infractions, and the felony conviction for transporting
stolen automobiles and two bankruptcies of the other principal; ordered to stop selling
unregistered securities through unregistered dealers and committing fraud); Indictment,
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intermodal shipping containers, any financials to support the guarantee,
and the correct name of one principal and his felony convictions for crim-
inal securities fraud in 1990 and 1996.
Several actions did not involve serial fraudsters with a track record of
violations. One dealt with digital currency, which the TSSB believes poses
serious risks to investors with minimal protection.216 Balanced Energy
sold working interests in Texas oil and gas prospects advertised at the
Texas Bitcoin Conference and social media, claiming first year returns up
to 117% by taking payment through Bitcoin.217 The issuer would convert
the Bitcoin to traditional currency to pay for operations without disclos-
ing the risks inherent in oil and gas investments and the risks in using
Bitcoin including the impact on operations caused by price fluctuations of
the digital currency.218
Another scheme dealt with an options trading program with two ver-
sions promising astronomical returns.219 One version, touted as a rescue
plan for retirement accounts, would authorize the fraudster to trade op-
tions in the investor’s online account following a proprietary strategy that
would yield 1% to 3% weekly and rarely lost money.220 The other version
was to lend the fraudster money to trade options with 24% simple inter-
est.221 The fraudster failed to disclose his track record in trading options
and the risks in trading options.222
United States v. Jones, No. 4:14-cr-00020 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 15, 2014), https://
www.ssb.texas.gov/sites/default/files/files/news/Intermodal_indict_unsealed022714.pdf
[https://perma.cc/947C-BV4K] (¶ 1 defendant successor to EcoEnergy Group; ¶ 7 third
party leases shams to create appearance of being leased; counts 2-6 made payments to
investors [establishing the Ponzi scheme]); see also Original Petition, Lin v. Jones, No.
201464889 (Dist. Ct., Harris County, Tex. Nov. 4, 2014), 2014 WL 6386472 (involving an
investor suing for securities fraud under TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33).
216. See TEX. ST. SEC. BD., TEXAS SECURITIES COMMISSIONER WARNS ABOUT RISKS
ASSOCIATED WITH INVESTMENTS TIED TO DIGITAL CURRENCIES (Feb. 25, 2014), https://
www.ssb.texas.gov/news-publications/texas-securities-commissioner-warns-about-risks-as
sociated-investments-tied [https://perma.cc/ZXE2-EB8F] (describing digital currencies as
not subject to regulation, is extremely volatile in price, has questionable security, is subject
to hackers, provides promoters anonymity, and is dependent on future acceptance in the
commercial marketplaces).
217. See In re Balanced Energy, LLC, No. ENF-14-CDO-1731, 2014 WL 986102, at *3
(Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Mar. 10, 2014) (ordered to stop selling unregistered securities and com-
mitting fraud); see also In re Balanced Energy, LLC, No. 312-14-3801, 2014 WL 2441657, at
*1 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. May 28, 2014) (administrative hearing).
218. See In re Balanced Energy, LLC, 2014 WL 986102, at *3 (ordered to stop selling
unregistered securities and committing fraud); see also In re Balanced Energy, LLC, 2014
WL 2441657, at *1 (administrative hearing).
219. See generally In re Ross Edmond Taylor, No. ENF-14-CDO-1733, 2014 WL
2441655 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. May 27, 2014) (involving no disclosure of a lien filed against him
for a judgment for failing to pay on a credit agreement; fraudster ordered to stop selling
unregistered securities and committing fraud).
220. Id. at *1.
221. Id. at *2.
222. Id.
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3. Errant Market Operators
Besides dealers involved with unregistered securities, the TSSB prose-
cuted several enforcement actions against other dealers and selling
agents. These dealers failed to supervise their agents by enforcing their
policies and incurred administrative fines.223 In separate multi-state ac-
tions, both Citigroup Global Markets Inc. and J.P. Morgan Securities,
LLC used unregistered sales assistants when their policies required regis-
tration of the sales assistants in the same states as the registered agent
they served.224 These sales assistants were missed by the computer pro-
grams used to check registrations.225 TD Ameritrade, Inc. failed to en-
force its policy when TD Ameritrade, Inc., using a manual process,
missed dealers who failed to send written disbursement notices related to
third-party wire transfers.226 WFG Investments, Inc. (WFG) failed to en-
force its policy that required its duly registered agents to limit individual
investments in private placements and to review financials before making
over-the-counter recommendations.227 The failure arose because WFG
regarded the sales of alternative investments as activities of the other reg-
istrant, even though WFG shared the commissions.228 The TSSB also re-
voked the registration of a selling agent and investment adviser
representative who impersonated as ex-clients before a former employer
to gain account information from a mutual fund.229
The TSSB had several enforcement actions against investment advisers
and investment-adviser representatives. These involved providing invest-
ment advice for a fee without registering,230 failing to appear at a revoca-
tion hearing concerning unsuitable recommendations,231 failing to comply
223. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-23-1(A)(3) (West 2010) (authorizing fines
for violations of the act or a TSSB rule); see also 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 115.10(b)(1)
(West 2016) (must reasonably enforce policies).
224. See generally In re Dealer Registration of Citigroup Global Mkt. Inc., No. IC15-
CAF-02, 2015 WL 5000404 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Aug. 18, 2015) (reprimanded with Texas fine
of $35,000); In re Dealer Registration of J.P. Morgan Sec., LLC, No. IC14-CAF-04, 2014
WL 1996994 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. May 12, 2014) (reprimanded with Texas fine of $74,000).
225. See generally In re Dealer Registration of Citigroup Global Mkt. Inc., 2015 WL
5000404 (reprimanded with Texas fine of $35,000); In re Dealer Registration of J.P. Morgan
Sec., LLC, 2014 WL 1996994 (reprimanded with Texas fine of $74,000).
226. See In re Dealer Registration of TD Ameritrade, Inc., No. IC15-CAF-01, 2015 WL
4607664, at *1–2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. July 27, 2015) (reprimanded with fine of $300,000 and
$100,000 contribution to Investor Education Fund of the Investor Protection Trust).
227. See In re Dealer Registration of WFG Inv., Inc., No. IC15-CAF-03, 2015 WL
5316799, at *1–2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Sept. 3, 2015) (reprimanded with fine of $175,000).
228. See id.
229. See In re Agent and Inv. Adviser Representative Registrations of Lloyd James
Chappell, No. IC14-REV-01, 2013 WL 7022571, at *2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Nov. 19, 2013)
(default order).
230. See generally In re Lance A. Bell, No. ENF-14-CDO-1735, 2014 WL 3954092 (Tex.
St. Sec. Bd. Aug. 1, 2014).
231. See generally In re Inv. Adviser Registration of Warren Fin. Serv., LLC, No. IC14-
REV-05, 2014 WL 3022275 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. June 27, 2014) (default order of revocation
and stop fraudulent conduct); see also In re Inv. Adviser Registration of Warren Fin. Serv.,
LLC, No. IC14-03, 2014 WL 2154270 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. May 19, 2014) (involving a fraudster
who sold investment paying 2.5–5% of the gross income for 3–7 years of Warren Financial
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with a prior undertaking,232 failing to report a felony charge to the TSSB
and the firm as required by the firm’s policy,233 and failing to disclose to
clients the firm’s receipt of fees from the brokerage used to execute the
trades.234
III. SECURITIES FRAUD DECISIONS UNDER THE
FEDERAL ACTS
The fraud provisions of the TSA are modeled on the federal statutes.
Therefore, Texas courts look to federal decisions under the federal stat-
utes to interpret TSA provisions with similar language.235 As a result,
there is an interest in Fifth Circuit securities law fraud opinions. Fraud
actions under the federal statutes generally possess six elements: (1) a
material misrepresentation or omission; (2) scienter; (3) a connection
with a purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance; (5) economic loss; and
(6) “loss causation,” that is, a causal connection between the material
misrepresentation and the loss.236 The last element comes from the Pri-
vate Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA).237 The U.S. Supreme
Court, considering a Fifth Circuit case for the second time, dealt with the
reliance requirement.238 The burning issue for the Supreme Court, in a
never ending saga filed in 2002 to politically embarrass a sitting Vice
Services, failed to pay, unsuitably recommended the investment, and withdrew funds from
third-party client custodial accounts without authorization).
232. See generally In re Inv. Adviser Registration of Wealth Solutions, Inc., No. IC14-
CAF-02, 2014 WL 656867 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Feb. 19, 2014) (involving failure to timely make
restitution payments; reprimanded and ordered to comply with the undertaking); In re
Application for Inv. Adviser Representative Registration of Bruce William Schoendorf,
No. REG 15-SUS-01 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Apr. 8, 2015), https://www.ssb.texas.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/files/news/REG15SUS-01.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ZYA-A2ME] (deciding not to
exercise discretion over an account, granting the registration, reprimanding, and sus-
pending for ten days).
233. See generally In re Application for Inv. Adviser Representative Registration of
Jetmir Ahemeti, No. REG 15-SUS-02 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Oct. 21, 2015), https://
www.ssb.texas.gov/sites/default/files/files/news/REG15SUS02.pdf [https://perma.cc/YYH8-
APYR] (an assault, granting the registration, reprimanding, and suspending for thirty
days); see also 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §116.9(a)(2) (West 2016) (registered investment ad-
viser report a felony action to TSSB within thirty days).
234. See generally In re Inv. Adviser Registration of Mowery Capital Mgmt., LLC, No.
312-15-1299, 2015 WL 4868701 (Tex. St. Off. Admin. Hgs. July 31, 2015) (involving nondis-
closure of a 2005 bankruptcy filing; principal altered documents concerning an unregis-
tered investment representative used for referrals; proposed order to revise brochure, firm
and its principal to pay administrative fine of $20,000 each); see also In re Inv. Adviser
Registration of Mowery Capital Mgmt., LLC, No. IC 15-01, 2014 WL 6656703 (Tex. St. Sec.
Bd. Nov. 17, 2014) (notice for administrative hearing: with additional charges that the
firm’s clients paying higher fees than the brokerage’s other clients and the principal’s plagi-
arism of a research report posted on the firm’s website). The unregistered investment ad-
viser representative was Kenneth Warren Paxton, the current Texas Attorney General. See
generally In re Inv. Adviser Representative Registration of Kenneth Warren Paxton, Jr.,
No. IC14-CAF-03, 2014 WL 1875790 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. May 2, 2014) (reprimand and ad-
ministrative fine of $1000).
235. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
236. See Dura Pharm, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341 (2005) (discussing commission
Rule 10b-5 and 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011)).
237. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2012).
238. See generally Erica P. John Fund, Inc., v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011).
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President of the United States,239 concerned whether an issuer can use
price impact to rebut the fraud-on-the-market theory’s rebuttable pre-
sumption of reliance at the class certification stage.240 In other cases, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit discussed the scienter require-
ment, considering whether following agency ratings that later proved in-
correct241 and whether boasting about an oil concession’s prospects
hoping for ultimate vindication, establish a strong inference of scienter.242
A. PRICE IMPACT ADMISSIBLE AT CLASS CERTIFICATION TO REBUT
THE RELIANCE PRESUMPTION
Congress passed the PSLRA243 to discourage extortive securities litiga-
tion.244 This included filing class action lawsuits for securities fraud when-
ever a significant change in the issuer’s price occurred and following after
class certification with an abuse of the discovery process to impose such
burdensome costs on the issuer to make it more economical for the vic-
timized issuer to settle, thereby harming its current shareholders.245 To
discourage this sort of abusive class action, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit had imposed a requirement for class certification that
requires the investors to prove “loss causation” before allowing substitu-
tion of fraud-on-the-market theory’s rebuttable presumption for the reli-
239. See Archdiocese of Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., No. 3:02-
CV-1152-M, 2008 WL 4791492 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2008) (mem. op.), aff’d, Archdiocese of
Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 597 F.3d 330 (5th Cir. 2010), rev’d,
Erica P. John Fund, Inc., v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011), on remand, Archdio-
cese of Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 647 F.3d 533 (5th Cir. 2011),
on remand, Archdiocese of Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., No. 3:02-
CV-1152-M, 2012 W.L. 565997, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 27, 2012), aff’d, Erica P. John Fund,
Inc., v. Halliburton Co., 718 F.3d 423 (5th Cir. 2013), rev’d, Halliburton Co. v. Erica P.
John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014), on remand, Erica P. John Fund, Inc., v. Halliburton
Co., 765 F.3d 550 (5th Cir. 2014), on remand, Erica P. John Fund, Inc., v. Halliburton Co.,
No. 3:02-CV-1152-M, 2015 WL 4522863 (N.D. Tex. July 25, 2015); see also George Lee
Flint, Jr., Securities Regulation, 64 SMU LAW REV. 535, 550 (2011) (discussing Fifth Cir-
cuit’s 2010 opinion); Flint 66, supra note 3, at 1151 (discussing Supreme Court’s 2011 opin-
ion); Flint 1, supra note 14, at 113 (discussing the Fifth Circuit’s 2013 opinion).
The securities fraud class action was filed June 3, 2002. See Memorandum of Law in
Support of Motion for Consolidation and Transfer of Related Cases, for Appointment of
the Archdiocese of Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc. and John Miletello as Lead Plaintiffs
and for Approval of Lead Plaintiffs’ Selection of Counsel at 6, Moore v. Halliburton Co.,
No. 3:02-CV-1152-M (N.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2002), 2002 WL 34235272. The alleged fraud in-
volved false statements about the issuer’s potential liability from asbestos litigation, ac-
counting of revenue in the issuer’s engineering and construction business, and benefits to
the issuer of a merger, some made by Richard Cheny, the issuer’s chief executive officer.
See Halliburton, 134 S. Ct. at 2405. At the time of filing, Richard Cheny was Vice President
of the United States.
240. Halliburton, 131 S. Ct. at 2184–86.
241. See Owens v. Jastrow, 789 F.3d 529, 541 (5th Cir. 2015).
242. See Spitzberg v. Hous. Am. Energy Corp., 758 F.3d 676 (5th Cir. 2014), rev’g, In re
Hous. Am. Energy Corp., 970 F. Supp. 2d 613 (S.D. Tex. 2013).
243. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2012).
244. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-369, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 31 (1995), reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730.
245. See id.
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ance element in a cause of action.246 To invoke the U.S. Supreme Court’s
rebuttable presumption, the investors need to establish (1) the perpetra-
tor made public misrepresentations; (2) the misrepresentations were ma-
terial; (3) the securities traded in an efficient market; and (4) the
investors traded between the misstatement and the revealing of the
truth.247 Although the Supreme Court generally requires proof at the cer-
tification stage of the elements necessary to establish the class,248 the Su-
preme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit; the Supreme Court concluded
that proof of loss causation is not required to obtain benefit of the pre-
sumption of reliance.249 But the Supreme Court left open the issue of
whether the issuer could use “price impact” to rebut an element of the
presumption at the class certification stage.250 After the district court’s
certification of the class,251 the Fifth Circuit determined, under the Su-
preme Court’s newly enunciated test,252 that price impact could not be
used to rebut the presumption at class certification.253 The Supreme
Court, in Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Erica P. John Fund
II), finally decided to add its contribution to stopping extortive securities
fraud class actions and reversed and remanded.254
The Supreme Court accepted the appeal to consider whether to over-
rule the established reliance presumption,255 as well as to resolve a con-
flict in the circuits.256 Several amici curiae sought to abolish the
246. See Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 264–65
(5th Cir. 2007), confirmed by Archdiocese of Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc. v. Hallibur-
ton Co., 597 F.3d 330, 335 (5th Cir. 2010); see also George Lee Flint, Jr., Securities Regula-
tion, 61 SMU L. REV. 1107, 1128–29 (2008) [hereinafter Flint 61] (discussing Oscar, 487
F.3d 261).
247. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248 n.27 (1988); see also Amgen Inc. v.
Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1192–93 (2013).
248. See Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432 (2013) (involving an anti-trust
class action, holding that enough evidentiary proof that damages are capable of measure-
ment on a class-wide basis); Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551–52 (2011)
(deciding a Title VII class action; class action certification rule is not a pleading standard,
but party must affirmatively demonstrate compliance with the rule).
249. See Erica P. John Fund, Inc., v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2186 (2011) (error
to require proof of loss causation to obtain class certification).
250. See id. at 2187 (to the extent the issuer preserved any further arguments against
class certification).
251. See Archdiocese of Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., No. 3:02-
CV-1152-M, 2012 WL 565997, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 27, 2012) (also denying the issuer any
ability to supplement the record as untimely, despite using an incorrect principle when
making that record).
252. See Amgen Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 1194–99.
253. See Erica P. John Fund, Inc., v. Halliburton Co., 718 F.3d 423, 434 (5th Cir. 2013)
[hereinafter Erica P. John Fund I].
254. See generally Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. , 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014)
[hereinafter Erica P. John Fund II].
255. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 636 (2013) (granting certio-
rari); see Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Erica P. John Fund II, 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014)
(No. 13-317). Several amici curiae had advocated for the abolition. See infra note 257 and
accompanying text.
256. Compare In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig., 544 F.3d 474, 484 (2d Cir.
2008) (“[D]efendants are allowed to rebut the presumption prior to class certification, by
showing, for example, the absence of a price impact . . . .”), and In re DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig.,
639 F.3d 623, 638 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[W]e believe rebuttal of the presumption of reliance falls
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rebuttable reliance presumption that had become no longer rebuttable
and to replace it with a remedy resembling the only other aftermarket
securities law remedy for fraud: fraud in documents filed with the SEC,
which statutorily requires individual reliance, thereby foreclosing securi-
ties fraud class actions.257 Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment,
called for the same.258 The majority,259 however, refused to go so far as to
abolish the reliance presumption.260 With respect to overturning any pre-
sumption, the Supreme Court requires special justification, not just that
the prior opinion was decided wrongly.261 Halliburton failed to make that
justification. Halliburton had two arguments for overturning the pre-
sumption. First, the presumption is inconsistent with the Exchange Act
(EA) in that it relieves the investors from proving reliance, which the
most analogous EA action for misrepresentations in regulatory filings re-
quires.262 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court considered this matter when
it adopted the presumption.263 Consequently, it does not rise to the level
of special justification.264 Second, empirical economic studies indicated
within the ambit of issues that, if relevant, should be addressed by district courts at the
class certification stage”), with Erica P. John Fund I, 718 F.3d at 435 (“[P]rice impact
fraud-on-the-market rebuttal evidence should not be considered at class certification.”),
and Schleicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Defendants say that, before
certifying a class, a court must determine whether false statements materially affected the
price. But whether statements were false, or whether the effects were large enough to be
called material, are questions on the merits.”).
These are basically the same conflicting opinions for granting review for Amgen Inc.
Amgen Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 1194; see Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8-13, Amgen Inc. v.
Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1189 (2013) (No. 11-1085). Clearly, the Supreme
Court is not adept at resolving conflict. But In re Salomon and In re DVI involved using
price impact to negate materiality. See In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig., 544 F.3d
at 484; In re DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig., 639 F.3d at 635–36.
257. See Brief for Former SEC Comm’rs & Officials & Law Professors as Amici Curiae
in Support of Petitioners at 9–19, Erica P. John Fund II, 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014) (No. 13-
317) (arguing that investors should have to prove actual reliance as in section 18(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, where “in reliance upon” the falsity must be shown); id.
at 19–22 (suggesting the court should overrule the presumption since it is effectively ir-
rebuttable); see also Brief for Chamber of Commerce & Nat’l. Ass’n of Mfr. as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 6–13, 17–18, Erica P. John Fund II, 134 S. Ct. 2398
(2014) (No. 13-317) (contending that the court should overrule or modify the presumption
of reliance due to excessive costs to businesses and due to modern studies calling into
question the presumptions approach to market efficiency); see also Brief for DRI-The
Voice of the Def. Bar as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 3–9, Erica P. John
Fund II, 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014) (No. 13-317) (suggesting that issuer can rebut the presump-
tion of reliance at the class certification stage with evidence of price impact).
In contrast, the SEC supported the investors. See Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Respondent at 6–7, Erica P. John Fund II, 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014) (No.
13-317) (advocating affirmance).
258. See Erica P. John Fund II, 134 S. Ct. at 2417–18 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing
that the presumption should be overruled).
259. The Supreme Court had another concurring opinion by Justice Ginsburg, in which
Justices Breyer and Sotomayor joined. See id. at 2417 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
260. Id. at 2414 (majority opinion).
261. Id. at 2407.
262. See 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (2012).
263. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 257–58 (1988) (White, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
264. Erica P. John Fund II, 134 S. Ct. at 2407–13.
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that markets were not efficient.265 Again, the Supreme Court had consid-
ered this matter when it adopted the presumption.266 Moreover, Con-
gress can overturn the presumption at any time. Congress did not do so
when adopting the PSLRA to curtail class actions after the Supreme
Court created the presumption.267
With respect to the conflict in the circuits, Halliburton again asserted
the point it had lost when the case was previously before the Supreme
Court—that the investors should have to prove price impact.268 Despite
rejecting that approach again, the Supreme Court did agree with Halli-
burton’s second alternative to overturning the presumption: that the is-
suer should at least have a chance to use price impact to rebut the
efficient market element of the presumption at the class certification
stage.269 Both parties agreed they could introduce some price impact in-
formation to prove or counter the market efficiency element. To disallow
price impact to rebut the presumption in its entirety would make no sense
(as judicially inefficient) and could lead to bizarre results, such as when a
court finds market efficiency (thereby certifying the class), but there is no
price impact from the alleged misrepresentation (defeating the entire
lawsuit).270 The remaining concern dealt with the Supreme Court’s prior
pronouncement that the materiality requirement of the presumption
could not be rebutted at the class certification stage.271 Materiality was
objective and common to all members of the class.272 It did not require
proof at the certification stage because it did not relate to common issues
predominating over issues impacting only individual members that the
265. Id. at 2409–11.
266. See Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 246–47 n.24 (majority opinion) (“We need not deter-
mine by adjudication what economists have debated . . . .”). Justice Thomas’s concurring
opinion in Erica P. John Fund II pointed out that those empirical studies are grossly out-
dated. See Erica P. John Fund II, 134 S. Ct. at 2420–21 (Thomas, J., concurring). The
assumption that public statements are reflected in the market price depends on where the
statement occurs: if “easily digestible (merger announcements or stock splits) or especially
prominent (Wall Street Journal articles),” dissemination is fast; if filed with the SEC, dis-
semination is slow. Id. at 2421. The assumption that investors rely on the integrity of price
ignores the belief that traders believing a stock is over- or under-valued; the fact that
trades occur because the parties disagree about price reflecting value; and the use of trades
to raise funds for liquidity, or taxes, or to rebalance portfolios. See id. at 2421–22.
267. Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion pointed out this stare decisis argument is spe-
cious. See id. at 2425. It does not apply outside of statutory interpretation, is speculative,
and the Supreme Court has violated it when decisions are unworkable, called into serious
question, or detrimental to consistency in the law. Id. Moreover, Congress, in passing the
PSLRA, provided that it did not ratify any private right of action. Id. at 2426–27; Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-67, § 203, 109 Stat. 737, 762 (1995)
(“Nothing in this Act or the amendments made by this Act shall be deemed to create or
ratify any implied private right of action . . . .”).
268. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 24, Erica P. John Fund II, 134 S. Ct. 2398
(2014) (No. 13-1317) (arguing that that court should modify the presumption to require
plaintiffs to prove price impact).
269. Erica P. John Fund II, 134 S. Ct. at 2414; see Petition for Writ of Certiorari at
26–32, Erica P. John Fund II, 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014) (No. 13-1317).
270. Erica P. John Fund II, 134 S. Ct. at 2415.
271. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (2016); Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds,
133 S. Ct. 1184, 1198, 1203–04 (2013).
272. Erica P. John Fund II, 134 S. Ct. at 2416.
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class certification rule requires. Clearly, price impact would fall within
this pronouncement.273 But the Supreme Court indicated that price im-
pact differs from materiality in that indirect evidence of price impact al-
ready comes into the certification determination when trying to prove or
disprove market efficiency.274 There is no reason to limit the amount of
price impact evidence to indirect evidence.275 Hence, the issuer may in-
troduce price impact evidence to rebut the presumption at the class certi-
fication stage.276
The decision reflects the Supreme Court’s efforts to reign in abusive
class action lawsuits by requiring proof of the prerequisites for class certi-
fication.277 This trend has the effect of making the class certification pro-
cess a mini-trial. This mini-trial aspect means both parties will need to
invest time and money in the pre-certification discovery process, hiring
experts to draft reports and conduct event studies on price impact.278 Be-
cause the investors’ attorney typically works on a contingency fee, being
paid only upon recovery or settlement, and given the fact that cases with-
out a price impact will not advance far enough to permit recovery of pre-
certification discovery costs, the mini-trial aspect should reduce the num-
ber of securities fraud class actions by eliminating those the investors’
lawyer believes lack merit and declines to pursue. For issuers, the mini-
trial aspect advancing proof of price impact to the class certification stage
provides a weapon to defeat non-meritorious securities fraud class actions
before they reach the in terrorem class certified stage.
B. ESTABLISHING A STRONG INFERENCE OF SCIENTER
The PSLRA also requires that the investors petition to recite facts giv-
ing a strong inference of scienter.279 In the Fifth Circuit, scienter requires
intent to defraud, severe recklessness with knowledge of the danger to
investors, or action despite danger so obvious the officer must have been
aware of the danger.280 Moreover, the Fifth Circuit has rejected the group
pleading doctrine, so the scienter must be of a specific issuer officer—
scienter may not be implied from prospectuses, registration statements,
273. Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion expressed the concern that the reliance pre-
sumption was becoming irrebuttable with the removal of evidentiary proof for its predi-
cates. See id. at 2424–25 (Thomas, J., concurring). Although the presumption is rebuttable
at the merit stage, the presumption essentially removes reliance from the case due to the in
terrorem pressure for settlement. Id. at 2424 n.7.
274. Id. at 2416 (majority opinion).
275. Id. at 2417.
276. Id. at 2414–15.
277. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
278. See Erica P. John Fund II, 134 S. Ct. at 2417 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (expressing
the belief that the added costs of discovery will not impose a heavy toll on investors with
meritorious claims).
279. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2012) (“[T]he complaint shall . . . state with particu-
larity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state
of mind.”).
280. See Southland Secs. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Sols., Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 366 (5th Cir.
2004); see also George Lee Flint, Jr., Securities Regulation, 58 SMU L. REV. 1135, 1155–56
(2005) (discussing Southland, 365 F.3d 353).
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and press releases.281 The Fifth Circuit dealt with two cases involving the
scienter issue. One reveals the difficulty of relying on circumstantial alle-
gations for executives following the industry norm; the other reveals that
allegations of the failure to follow industry norms might constitute
recklessness.282
Owens v. Jastrow283 involved the collapse of Guaranty Bank of Austin,
Texas, in 2009,284 in the wake of the last financial and housing crisis. A
few days later, the bank’s holding company filed for bankruptcy.285 Two
years later, the holding company’s bankruptcy trustee filed an action
against the holding company’s prior parent and several executive officers,
including those of the holding company, for looting the holding company
and bank prior to spinning off the holding company to avoid making capi-
tal infusions into the holding company and bank.286 The action resulted in
an $80 million settlement.287 Armed with this assertion, former share-
holders of the holding company filed a securities fraud action against four
executives, the chairman of the board, the chief executive officer, the
chief financial officer, and the controller. The district court dismissed the
action for failure to allege facts providing a strong inference of scien-
ter.288 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.289
The shareholders alleged four circumstantial factual matters for scien-
ter. First, these executives, except for the controller, knew the bank was
undercapitalized through attendance at meetings to raise more capital.290
This alone is insufficient because all corporate executives possess the de-
sire to raise more capital.291 The Fifth Circuit has held multiple times that
a desire to raise capital, receive incentive compensation, and sell stock at
inflated prices, is insufficient to show a strong inference of scienter.292
Second, these executive officers knew the bank’s portfolio of non-agency
281. See Southland, 365 F.3d at 366.
282. See Owens v. Jastrow, 789 F.3d 529, 541 (5th Cir. 2015); Spitzberg v. Hous. Am.
Energy Corp., 758 F.3d 676 (5th Cir. 2014), rev’g In re Hous. Am. Energy Corp., 970 F.
Supp. 2d 613 (S.D. Tex. 2013).
283. Because the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal for failure to plead a strong infer-
ence of scienter, it did not reach the loss causation issue or whether an outside director was
a maker of the misrepresentations. See Owens, 789 F.3d at 546–47.
284. See Press Release, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, BBVA Compass, Bir-
mingham, Alabama, Assumes All of the Deposits of Guaranty Bank, Austin, Texas (Aug.
21, 2009), https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2009/pr09150.html [https://perma.cc/
QXP2-4WZG] (closing Guaranty Bank cost the agency’s insurance fund $3 billion).
285. See Mark G. Douglas, The Year in Bankruptcy 2009: Part I, PRATT’S J. BANKR. L.
2010.03-9.
286. Owens, 789 F.3d at 534.
287. Id.; see Plaintiff’s Original Complaint ¶ 5, Tepper v. Temple-Inland, Inc., No.
11CV02088 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 22, 2011), 2011 WL 3665678 (explaining that cross-covenants
provided that if bank became insolvent, Temple-Inland’s debt defaulted); id. ¶¶ 227–431
(claiming sixteen counts of fraudulent transfers and breaches of fiduciary duty).
288. Owens, 789 F.3d at 534.
289. Id. at 547.
290. Id. at 538.
291. Id. at 539.
292. See Goldstein v. MCI WorldCom, 340 F.3d 238, 246 (5th Cir. 2003); Abrams v.
Baker Hughes Inc., 292 F.3d 424, 434 (5th Cir. 2002).
474 SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY [Vol. 2
mortgage backed securities, amounting to 22% of the bank’s assets, was
performing poorly with a 250% increase in delinquency rate, a drop in
value to 60% of cost, and a downgrading of ten of its securities.293 These
“red flags” did not provide a strong inference of scienter because they
were promptly disclosed to the marketplace.294 Third, these officers knew
their reported valuations of the non-agency mortgage-backed securities
violated generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) by not recog-
nizing losses as “other than temporary.”295 These reported valuations,
however, were accompanied by explanatory and cautionary information,
such as disclosing that the valuations were difficult, involved a high de-
gree of uncertainty, and might prove to be materially wrong.296 Further,
the chief executive officer and chief financial officer had received emails
from other officers identifying valuation deficiencies without mentioning
GAAP.297 But the mortgage-backed securities were rated AAA by the
rating agencies, and the bank’s regulator (the Office of Thrift Supervi-
sion) regarded these ratings as crucial in valuing the securities.298 Fourth,
the magnitude of the valuation errors was large.299 But the entire industry
relied on the AAA ratings in the face of uncertainty and disagreement
about the valuation of mortgage-backed securities.300
The shareholders’ main ground for reversal was that the district court’s
two-step process of examining each allegation, weighing each allegation
separately first before weighing them collectively, conflicted with the U.S.
Supreme Court’s requirement that courts weigh all allegations holisti-
cally.301 But the Fifth Circuit, even after the Supreme Court’s pronounce-
ment, has approved the two-step process as being more efficient.302 If one
of the allegations is sufficient, the court need not examine the other alle-
gations. The executives’ main ground for affirmance was that the share-
holders’ allegations contained impermissible group pleading. The Fifth
Circuit agreed that the shareholders mixed individually specific allega-
tions with group allegations, but felt confident that it could separate out
which group allegations applied to which executive.303 When the Fifth
Circuit examined all the allegations holistically, it determined that the
executives merely exhibited poor business judgment, similar to thousands
293. See Appellant’s Opening Brief at 47, Owens v. Jastrow, 789 F.3d 529 (5th Cir.
2015) (No. 13-10928), 2014 WL 796024. Non-agency mortgage backed securities are issued
by private institutions and do not conform to the requirements of those guaranteed by
agencies such as Ginnie Mae, Fannie Mae, or Freddie Mac. See id. at 9–10.
294. Owens, 789 F.3d at 540.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 541.
297. Id. at 544.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 541.
300. Id. at 544.
301. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 326 (2007); Owens,
789 F.3d at 536.
302. Owens, 789 F.3d at 537; see Cent. Laborers’ Pension Fund v. Integrated Elec.
Servs. Inc., 497 F.3d 546, 552–55 (5th Cir. 2007); see also Flint 61, supra note 246, at
1123–25 (discussing Central Laborers, 497 F.3d 546).
303. Owens, 789 F.3d at 538.
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of other financial institutions relying on AAA ratings during the crises
that were unable to fully appreciate the severity of the crises and recog-
nize that their securities had become riskier than originally believed.304
In Spitzberg v. Houston American Energy Corp., the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit dealt with a company developing an oil and gas
concession in Colombia.305 Within days of a 35% plunge in the value of
the stock, shareholders brought a Rule 10b-5 action for securities fraud
against the company, two of its officers, and several of its directors. The
shareholders alleged two misrepresentations. First, in a slide presentation
to investors in 2009, the company claimed its concession had recoverable
reserves of four billion barrels.306 The term “reserves” means estimated
amounts based on actual production or formation tests.307 The company
had not conducted any formation tests, much less achieved actual produc-
tion. Second, regulatory filings in 2011 claimed a well on the concession
“produced ‘strong inflow[s]’ and ‘significant shows’ of both ‘gas and oil’”
at a time when the well produced no inflows or shows.308 The district
court dismissed the action for failure to plead a sufficiently strong infer-
ence of both scienter and loss causation. The Fifth Circuit reversed and
remanded.309
The Fifth Circuit found that allegations surrounding both of these mis-
representations represented recklessness and hence satisfied the height-
ened scienter requirement of the PSLRA.310 For the slide show
misrepresentations, the investors also alleged a news website decrying the
company’s claim for reserves as the most audacious claim by any com-
pany operating in Colombia.311 Using the term “reserves” to mean some-
thing other than what the industry understands it to mean constituted
recklessness because the allegations showed it had seriously misled inves-
304. Id. at 545.
305. See Spitzberg v. Hous. Am. Energy Corp., 758 F.3d 676, 680 (5th Cir. 2014).
306. See Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 6, Spitzberg, 758 F.3d 676 (5th Cir. 2014) (No.
13-20519) (stating that the Form 8-K filing included slides prepared for an investor
presentation).
307. See SOC’Y OF PETROLEUM ENG’RS, Petroleum Resources Management System,
2008, at 1, 3, 24, http://www.spe.org/industry/docs/Petroleum_Resources_Management_
System_2007.pdf [https://perma.cc/2LXU-6CN6] (“To be included in the Reserves class,
there must be a high confidence in the commercial producibility of the reservoir as sup-
ported by actual production or formation tests.”); compare id. at 44 (“Reserves are those
quantities of petroleum anticipated to be commercially recoverable by application of de-
velopment projects to known accumulations from a given date . . . .”), with 17 C.F.R.
§ 210.4-10(a)(26) (2011) (“Reserves are estimated remaining quantities of oil and gas and
related substances anticipated to be economically producible, as of a given date, by appli-
cation of development projects to known accumulations.”), and Modernization of Oil and
Gas Reporting, 74 Fed. Reg. 2158, 2160 (Jan. 14, 2009) (“The revisions and additions to the
definition section . . . update our reserves definitions to reflect changes in the oil and gas
industry . . . designed to be consistent with the Petroleum Resource Management System
(PRMS)”).
308. Spitzberg, 758 F.3d at 681.
309. Id. at 676.
310. Id. at 684.
311. See Consolidated Class Action Complaint ¶ 79, In re Hous. Am. Energy Corp. Sec.
Litig., 970 F. Supp. 2d. 613 (S.D. Tex. 2013) (No. 4:12-cv-01332) (referring to allegations
about the Shareshleuth.com article).
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tors.312 For the misrepresentations in the regulatory filings, the investors
also alleged that a confidential witness, an employee of the company’s
partner who did the drilling, reported that there were no inflows or shows
from the well on the concession and as a result his company refused to
drill an additional test well.313 Consequently, a falsity that related to es-
sentially the entire business of the operation constituted recklessness
since it could seriously mislead investors.314 The Fifth Circuit found this
conclusion supported by another allegation: the allegation that the SEC
had issued subpoenas for the testimony of the chief executive officer and
chief financial officers and for certain documents to determine whether
the company had violated the securities laws.315 Pressure from the news
website and the SEC could have mandated the company’s additional well
test to prove them wrong.316
Scienter was not the only securities issue confronted by the Fifth Cir-
cuit in Spitzberg. The second ground for dismissal by the district court
was failure to allege a heightened loss causation, negating other possible
explanations such as changed economic circumstances or investor expec-
tations or industry specific facts.317 The Fifth Circuit recognizes no such
requirement; notice pleading is sufficient.318 Instead, a stock drop after a
312. The fraudsters claimed that investors would not be misled since they had only
referred to future drillings. Spitzberg, 758 F.3d at 689–90. Had there been any past dril-
lings, they would have named them. Moreover, they had disclaimers in the slide show that
they were using terms that the SEC prohibits in its filings. Unfortunately, such a disclaimer
did not identify “reserves” as one of those definitions. Id. at 690–91. The prohibited terms
in a previous era were “probable reserves” and “possible reserves.” As of the beginning of
the year in which the slide show occurred, the SEC allowed in probable reserves and possi-
ble reserves. See Modernization of Oil and Gas Reporting, 74 Fed. Reg. 2158, 2167 (Jan.
14, 2009).
313. See Consolidated Class Action Complaint ¶¶ 63, 95, In re Hous. Am. Energy
Corp. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 2d. 613 (S.D. Tex. 2013) (No. 4:12-cv-01332) (describing
allegations by confidential witnesses and SK Innovation Co’s refusal to drill a second test
well).
314. Spitzberg, 758 F.3d at 684.
315. See id. at 686; Consolidated Class Action Complaint ¶¶ 106, 110, In re Hous. Am.
Energy Corp. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 2d. 613 (S.D. Tex. 2013) (No. 4:12-cv-01332).
316. See Spitzberg, 758 F.3d at 684. The trial court could not imagine any company
wasting a huge amount of money on a test well unless it believed there was oil present,
negating scienter. See In re Hous. Am. Energy Corp. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 2d 613, 654
(S.D. Tex. 2013), rev’d, Spitzberg, 758 F.3d 676 (“[T]o spend another $5 million for more
testing . . . was a desperate ‘Hail Mary’ decision [that] does not make sense for a small
company . . . .”).
317. Spitzberg, 758 F.3d at 686–87. The district court claimed not to use a heightened
test, then did. See In re Hous. Am. Energy Corp., 970 F. Supp. 2d at 620 (stating that notice
pleading, not heightened pleading, is sufficient); but cf. id. at 654 (“Plaintiffs fail to address
whether the alleged misstatements or omissions were the actual cause of their economic
loss as opposed to other explanations . . . .”). The district court’s error was to incorrectly
cite a portion of a Supreme Court decision relating to what needs to be proved and to
disregard the Supreme Court’s avoidance as to whether the securities laws require more
than notice pleading. See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342–44 (2005).
318. See Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 267 (5th Cir. 2009) (“[W]e are not
authorized or required to determine whether the plaintiff’s plausible inference of loss cau-
sation is equally or more plausible than other competing inferences . . . .”); see also George
Lee Flint, Jr., Securities Regulation, 63 SMU L. REV. 795, 809–11 (2010) [hereinafter Flint
63] (discussing Lormand, 565 F.3d 228).
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corrective disclosure is enough for loss causation allegations; the correc-
tive disclosure does not have to be complete or mirror the misstatement
either.319 Consequently, an allegation that the stock plunged 35% when
the issuer announced the abandonment of well drilling on the concession
was sufficient to allege loss causation.320
The Fifth Circuit also addressed two other issues with respect to the
slide presentation. First, the fraudsters asserted that their slide presenta-
tion was protected by the PSLRA safe harbor for forward-looking state-
ments.321 The Fifth Circuit noted that the slide presentation was a mixed
statement.322 Estimated recoverable reserves could be a forward-looking
statement, but the shareholders saw the reserves as meaning that there
had been past drilling on which to base the amount of reserves. Because
the misrepresentations concerned the non-forward-looking statements,
the Fifth Circuit decided to join the First, Third, and Seventh Circuits in
denying the safe harbor to mixed statements.323 Second, the fraudsters
asserted that the two-year statute of limitations began when they filed a
Form 10-K with the SEC that there were only 1.2 million barrels of
proved reserves, thus negating the claim of 4 billion reserves.324 the
fraudsters argued that the two years had elapsed before the shareholders
filed.325 The Fifth Circuit found this unpersuasive because “proved
reserves” is a subcategory of reserves and so does not negate the
misrepresentation.326
IV. CONCLUSION
Several courts addressed the scope issues of the TSA and the TSFA. In
an action by investors against a serial fraudster, the Texas Supreme Court
determined that the interests in life settlements sold by the fraudster con-
stituted investment contracts under the TSA and therefore constituted
securities. The year before, a federal district court in Texas had deter-
mined the same and enabled the SEC to levy serious civil fines against a
serial fraudster, resulting in the issuer seeking bankruptcy protection. The
First Houston Court of Appeals found that an agreement, among other
things, also transferred ownership of previously awarded stock subject to
forfeiture by eliminating the forfeiture provision that dealt with a transac-
tion involving stock in a corporation under the TSFA. Thereby an em-
319. See Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Flowserve Corp., 572 F.3d 221, 230–32 (5th Cir.
2009); Flint 63, supra note 318, at 812 (discussing Alaska Electrical, 572 F.3d 221).
320. Spitzberg, 758 F.3d at 688–89.
321. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(a) (2012); Spitzberg, 758 F.3d at 691.
322. Spitzberg, 758 F.3d at 691.
323. Id.; see Institutional Inv’r Grp v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 255–56 (3d Cir. 2009);
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs Inc., 513 F.3d 702, 705 (7th Cir. 2008); In re Stone &
Webster, Inc. Sec. Litig., 414 F.3d 187, 213 (1st Cir. 2005).
324. See 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b) (providing that the statute of limitations on a private right
of action for violations of the EA runs either two years from discovery of facts or five years
from the violation); Spitzberg, 758 F.3d at 692.
325. Spitzberg, 758 F.3d at 692.
326. Id. at 692–93.
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ployer could bring suit against a defrauding employee under the
separation agreement that also provided for consulting work with a non-
disclosure provision and a non-competition provision. Because the agree-
ment also contained a non-compete, the Covenants Not to Compete Act
applied to legal fees, not the TSFA. For both the TSA and TSFA, the
U.S. Supreme Court confirmed that non-covered securities backed by,
but not secured by, covered securities did not trigger the preemptive ef-
fect of SLUSA.
The TSSB made several additions to its rules, mostly coordinating with
the federal scheme. Since the SEC has recently finalized its crowdfunding
rules, the TSSB adopted one to permit sales to Texans through a TSSB-
approved crowdfunding portal, limited to those efforts that are exempt
from the federal registration requirements through the intra-state exemp-
tion. The TSSB also adopted rules to correspond to SEC actions: one
exempting certain mergers and acquisition dealers and the other exempt-
ing certain investment advisers to private funds. The TSSB’s enforcement
efforts for unregistered securities focused primarily on serial fraudsters
advertising over the internet without disclosing their track record of se-
curities law violations and criminal convictions. The enforcement efforts
against market operators mostly dealt with multi-state actions against big
brokerages and their failure to supervise their employees to insure their
registration in the appropriate states. One Texas court of appeals re-
vealed the importance of defendants hiring securities lawyers to handle
appeals of TSSB orders since the TSA procedure is different from the
one specified in the Administrative Procedures Act.
For the federal fraud action, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed a Fifth
Circuit opinion on the rebuttable presumption of reliance, while the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit dealt with two cases concerning the
scienter requirement. The Supreme Court decided to permit introduction
of price impact of the misrepresentation by the issuer at the class certifi-
cation stage of a securities fraud class action lawsuit because the investors
must show an efficient market and already introduce some price impact
information for that purpose. The Fifth Circuit determined that allega-
tions of circumstances for bankers following industry norms with respect
to AAA rated investments does not give a strong inference of scienter. In
contrast, using terms contrary to the industry norms, such as “reserves”
by an oil and gas issuer, misleads investors, amounts to recklessness, and
so gives a strong inference of scienter.
